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I. INTRODUCTION 
The modem academic trend, as embodied in the Uniform Probate Code 
("UPC") and the new Uniform Trust Code ("UTC"), has been to move from an 
interventionist model of probate toward a minimalist approach to judicial 
intervention.1 That model may not be working when it comes to lawyers acting 
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University of Virginia 1983. The Author would like to thank Christia Pritts for her 
research assistance with this Article. She also would like to thank Marin Scordato, Jana 
Singer, David Hyman, Richard Boldt, Joan O'Sullivan, Saul Levmore, Julie Roin, and 
the Author's colleagues who participated in the University of Maryland School ofLaw 
Faculty Workshop on this topic for their valuable insights and suggestions. Finally, the 
Author would like to thank David English, the Editors of the Missouri Law Review, and 
the participants in the Uniform Trust Code Symposiumfortheirveryvaluable comments, 
as well. 
1. In large part, this has been a response to legitimate concerns about cost, delay, 
and corruption in the probate process on the part of the public and the profession. In 
some part, it has been an effort to synthesize the probate and nonprobate methods of 
wealth transmission upon death. See John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and 
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as fiduciaries. The ethical issues and monitoring problems inherent in the 
confidential relationship that characterizes the attorney/client/fiduciary 
relationship may warrant more, rather than less, intervention. 2 These monitoring 
problems and the underlying issues of conflict of interest are particularly acute 
when the lawyer acting as fiduciary drafted the instrument in which he or she 
was named. Traditional rules of fiduciary and agency law inform the 
attorney/client relationship as a whole and become even more pertinent when 
attorneys move from a general attorney/client relationship to a more "statutory" 
fiduciary relationship with a client or his or her beneficiaries as executor or 
trustee. This Article examines how those rules should inform a choice of 
appropriate ethical models for drafting attorney/fiduciaries.3 
There have been a number of cases in the media during the past decade that 
highlight the malfeasance oflawyers as executors and trustees. Lawyers are not 
ethically forbidden from acting as fiduciaries nor are they subject to any greater 
probate court scrutiny than laypeople when petitioning to be appointed as 
fiduciaries. This is true in most states, even when lawyers draft the instrument 
in which they are named as executor or trustee. This Article raises a red flag as 
to the revision of the ethical rules in this area proposed by the American Bar 
Association's Ethics 2000 Commission on the Evaluation of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct ("Ethics 2000") and approved by the ABA House of 
Delegates. The Ethics 2000 revision states that the Model Rules ofProfessional 
Conduct ("Model Rules") do not prohibit a lawyer from seeking (which is 
synonymous with "soliciting")4 to have himself or herself named as executor of 
the estate or to another potentially lucrative fiduciary position. 5 While othernew 
language in the Ethics 2000 proposal is a welcome clarification as to the 
the Future of the Law of Succession, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1108, 1115-25 {1984). 
2. For a summary of these monitoring problems, see Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. 
Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REv. 1089, 1126-30 (1981); 
Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. REv. 240 I, 2418-
20 (1995). 
3. For a discussion of the similarity between the principles of fiduciary and agency 
law with regard to fiduciary duties, see generally Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Duties as 
Default Rules, 74 OR. L. REv. 1209, 1242-51 (1995), which discusses limitations on 
waivers of rights to fiduciary duties, and Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, The Functions 
of Trust Law: A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 434, 
449 n.42 {1998) (citing Victor Brudney, Contract and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate Law, 
38 B.C. L. REv. 595,601-07 (1997), which discusses fiduciary obligations under trust 
and agency law). 
4. ROGET'S 21st CENTURY THESAURUS 713 {2d ed. 1999). 
5. ABA, Commission on Evaluation of the Rules ofProfessional Conduct, Report 
with Recommendations to the House of Delegates, Rule l.B(c) cmt. 8 (2001) [hereinafter 
ABA Report], available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-rulel8rem.html (last visited 
May 2, 2002). 
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disclosure duties of attorneys nominated as fiduciaries, the existence of the 
language with regard to seeking appointment is arguably a step backward in this 
area of attorney ethics. 
This Article proposes the adoption of a "disclosure" model6 with regard to 
drafting attorney/fiduciaries to minimize the dual harms of failing to protect 
client autonomy and of reputational harm to the legal profession as a whole. 
That model would include ethical rules that mandate full disclosure by the 
drafting attorney, which theoretically would result in informed consent by the 
client to the appointment of the lawyer/draftsperson. 7 In conjunction with such 
an ethical construct, the model also would include procedural and substantive 
rules that provide for increased judicial intervention and scrutiny in such cases. 
6. For a comprehensive analysis of the benefits of a disclosure model in another 
context, see William M. Sage, Regulating Through Infonnation: Disclosure Laws and 
American Health Care, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 1701, 1710-11 (1999) (identifying four 
important rationales for disclosure laws, including: (1) the "competition rationale," i.e., 
"disclosure can promote the competitive provision of health insurance and medical 
services," ameliorating "longstanding problems of asymmetric information affecting 
patients and purchasers . . . and serv[ing] goals of transactional and allocative 
efficiency;" (2) the "agency rationale," i.e., "disclosure •.. strengthen[s] agency 
relationships and enforce[ s] fiduciary obligations,'' thus "support[ing] efficient decision 
making and convey[ing] non-economic values such as respect for persons;" (3) the 
''performance rationale," i.e., "disclosure ..• overcome[ s] incomplete information" and, 
thus, enhances systemic performance; and ( 4) the "democratic rationale,'' i.e., "disclosure 
• • . increase[ s] public awareness" of rights and obligations and ''fosters distnoutive 
justice"). Sage has noted that "informed consumerism is incomplete as a normative 
model for health care because fiduciary responsibilities ..• traditionally have been 
defined apart from economic considerations or a contractual framework." Id. at 1711. 
Sage's observation is equally applicable to the delivery oflegal and fiduciary services. 
7. The Author uses the phrase ''theoretically" to acknowledge that informed 
consent does not necessarily follow from disclosure and that "consent'' is not always 
what it implies. Acquiescence is not always tantamount to fully informed consent, 
especially on the part of those in society most susceptible to subtle societal influence, 
including elderly clients, in general, and elderly women, in particular. See, e.g., Robin 
West, Liberalism and Abortion, 87 GEO. L.J. 2117 (1999). West has stated: 
Women consent to events and transactions and arrangements all the 
time-day in and day out-that do us considerable harm: from marriages, to 
love affairs, to one~night stands, to unequal pay for comparable work, to 
sexually harassing work and school environments, to second shifts in the 
home, to mommy tracks at work. The harm these consensual relations, 
environments, transactions, events, acts and transfers occasion become 
increasingly hard to describe, to quantify, to identify, to name, or to recognize 
as the language and apparatus of consent-based ethics overtake our moral as 
well as legal discursive world. 
Id. at2139. 
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Drafting attorneys would have the burden of proving disclosure and informed 
consent. Failing that, judges would have the discretion to refuse to appoint a 
personal representative or to put the representative on a supervised track. If the 
drafting attorney is the trust's sole trustee, the court would be required to remove 
the attorney if he or she could not rebut the presumption of lack of disclosure. 8 
In December of 1993, Fordham University School of Law convened an 
important conference on the pressing issues involved in representing the elderly 
in this country. The conference was the joint effort of a number of 
organizations, including: the American Bar Association ("ABA") Commission 
on Legal Problems of the Elderly; the ABA Section on Real Property, Probate 
and Trust Law; the American College ofT rust and Estate Counsel ("ACTEC"); 
and the National Academy ofElder Law Attorneys (''NABLA"). The insightful 
papers and recommendations that came out of that conference were published 
in a special issue of the Fordham Law Review and included the thoughtful 
article, The Lawyer in Other Fiduciary Roles: Policy and Ethical 
Considerations, by Edward D. Spurgeon and Mary Jane Ciccarello.9 That article 
revisited the issue of attorneys acting as fiduciaries, reviewed the previous 
literature on the subject, and made a number of important proposals that would 
8. The Author will leave for a future article a deeper exploration of the 
inadequacies of the disclosure model when it comes to fiduciary relationships. William 
Sage summarized them well in the health care context when he noted: 
[r]egulating fiduciary obligations through disclosure therefore presents a 
logical fallacy. To the extent that the fiduciary obligation between physician 
and patient arises from a relationship of dependence, not from an express 
contractual agreement, physicians' duty of loyalty arguably should not be 
waivable upon disclosure. 
Sage, supra note 6, at 1757-64. Similar concerns about lawyer/draftsperson/client 
relationships will be briefly considered herein, see infra notes 127-28 and accompanying 
text, but a longer analysis of the implications for a disclosure model, and of the 
disproportionate power relationship inherent in the lawyer/client relationship will be 
addressed in a future article. 
9. Edward D. Spurgeon & Mary Jane Ciccarello, The Lawyer in Other Fiduciary 
Roles: Policy and Ethical Considerations, 62 FORDHAM L. REv. 1357 {1994) 
[hereinafter Spurgeon & Ciccarello, The Lawyer in Other Fiduciary Roles J. This Article 
owes much to the premises laid out in Professor Spurgeon's and Attorney Ciccarello's 
article. It expands on their analysis and delineates additional procedural, statutory, and 
structural reforms necessary to deter inappropriate use of a,ttorney/fiduciaries and to 
safeguard the client if drafting attorneys are allowed to act as executors or trustees. This 
Article does not address the issue of attorneys appointed as guardians, a related issue but 
one that is so broad as to be outside the scope of this Article. However, Professor 
Spurgeon and Attorney Ciccarello recently have written about the specific issue of 
attorneys as guardians in a forthcoming article: Edward D. Spurgeon and Mary Jane 
Ciccarello, Lawyers Acting as Guardians: Policy and Ethical Considerations, 31 
STETSON L. REV. (forthcoming 2002). 
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enhance the guidance for attorneys acting in those roles. The Report of the 
Working Group on Lawyer as Fiduciary and the recommendations that came out 
of the conference made concrete proposals for reform in this area.10 In 
particular, these proposals focused on changes to the ethical principles embodied 
in the ABA's Model Rules. However, seven years later, the Ethics 2000 
Commission approach to clarification fails to implement these important 
proposals fully. · 
This Article picks up where Spurgeon, Ciccarello, and the Working Group 
left off, compares the suggested revisions of the ABA Ethics 2000 Commission 
to the Working Group's recommendations, and finds some things to laud but 
others to lament. It urges reconsidemtion by the Ethics 2000 Commission and 
further dmfting to incorpomte all of the safeguards offered by the Fordham 
Conference Working Group. 
This Article adds seveml other dimensions to the Fordham Conference's 
focus on ethical reform. In addition to endorsing many of the ethical reforms 
laid out seven years ago, it delves further into proceduml, statutory, and 
structuml reforms that will reduce the incentives for fiduciary abuse in this area 
of the law. The Article offers a cost/benefit analysis of these reforms and 
concludes that a multi-faceted approach to reform in this area is appropriate and 
justifies the economic and efficiency costs of some of the reforms proposed. 
Part II reviews the existing academic litemture and theories on the ethical 
propriety of dmfting attorneys naming themselves as fiduciaries. Part ill 
proposes changes to the ABA's Model Rules, and Part IV proposes reforms to 
the UPC and the new UTC that allow for increased intervention on the part of 
the probate court-and, thus, an increased level of protection for vulnemble 
elderly clients-in the appointment of dmfting attorney/fiduciaries in probate 
and trust proceedings. Part V proposes reforms to existing statutory approaches 
to fiduciary fee armngements that would provide disincentives for lawyers to act 
as fiduciaries in inappropriate cases. This Article concludes with additional 
reforms that will provide more monitoring and compensatory protections for 
clients in this area. 
This is a critical issue in an em when the American population is aging and 
increasingly vulnemble to financial abuse by lawyers acting as fiduciaries. As 
trillions of dollars pass from the World War II genemtion to the Baby Boom 
genemtion, the legal profession must continue its vigilance in analyzing the 
underlying ethical, proceduml, and structuml flaws in the wealth tmnsfersystem. 
10. Proceedings of the Conference on Ethical Issues in Representing Older 
Clients: Recommendations of the Conference, 62 FORDHAML. REv. 989,997 (1994) 
[hereinafter Recommendations of the Conference]; Ned Spurgeon & Mary Jane 
Ci~carello, Proceedings of the Conference on Ethical Issues in Representing Older 
Clients: Report of the Working Group on Lawyer as Fiduciary, 62 FORDHAML. REv. 
1055 (1994) [hereinafter Spurgeon & Ciccarello, Report of the Working Group]. 
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Failure to do so means risking further ethical lapses and consequent damage to 
both the public and the profession's overall image. 
What follows is a review of many of the monitoring problems inherent in 
fiduciary relationships identified by legal scholars, 11 as well as the ethical issues 
of solicitation, conflicts of interest, and overreaching raised by such practice. 
This Article then raises the issue whether the legal profession should revise its 
ethical rules when it comes to drafting attorneys naming themselves as 
fiduciaries. On a more conceptual level, it challenges the prevailing academic 
trend in the field of probate law that the preferable model of reallocating 
property at death is always a hands-off, minimalist approach to judicial 
intervention in the probate process. It argues for a more proactive model of 
judicial inquiry in this area. 
II. DRAFTING ATIORNEYS AS FIDUCIARIES: 
CURRENT ETHICAL MODELS 
The term fiduciary "is derived from the Roman law, and means a person . 
. . having a duty, created by his undertaking, to act primarily for another's 
benefit in matters connected with such undertaking"12 and includes "scrupulous 
good faith and candor"13 among its attributes. Some commentators have 
addressed the broader policy question as to whether lawyers have conflicts 
created by naming themselves and being appointed as personal representatives 
and trustees. 
Spurgeon and Ciccarello identified five possible options in terms of 
selecting an ethical paradigm for attorney/drafters being named as fiduciaries. 14 
From those five options, the Author would distill essentially three different 
models that have been offered to deal with this potential conflict of interest: (1) 
an "absolute prohibition" model; (2) an "increased judicial inquiry" model prior 
to fiduciary appointment; and (3) an "increased judicial inquiry model with 
teeth" that extends scrutiny beyond the initial appointment of a drafting 
attorney/fiduciary. This Part briefly reviews those models offered. The 
following Part proposes a model that adopts various components of the second 
and third approaches, and blends them with disclosure and increased judicial 
intervention. This "disclosure" model would place the burden of proving 
disclosure and informed consent explicitly on the drafting attorney. It would 
provide for judicial discretion as to either removal or continued supervision of 
11. See Scott & Scott, supra note 2, at 2418-20. 
12. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 431 (6th ed. 1990). 
13. /d. 
14. Spurgeon & Ciccarello, The Lawyer in Other Fiduciary Roles, supra note 9, 
at 1382-86. 
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the attorney during the probate process, if the attorney failed to meet his or her 
burden. This model departs from previous models by bifurcating the analysis 
when the fiduciary is a personal representative as opposed to a trustee, and it 
offers different tools with which to deal with the failure of meeting the burden. 
This differing approach to personal representatives versus trustees is justified on 
the basis of the differing costs to the wealth transfer system. The costs are fewer 
when it comes to increasing supervision in the rather short probate process. 
They begin to mount in the much longer time frame in which attorneys may act 
as trustees. 
Because lawyers are steeped in legal rules and hone their analytic abilities 
in law school, they appear well-suited to carry out the duties involved in 
representing the elderly, the disabled, and the dead.15 A sluup sense of the law 
lends itself to fulfilling the duties imposed by statute and case law on executors 
and trustees. The ethical training in law school and the regulation oflawyers as 
a profession should produce good candidates for fiduciary positions. 
What are the general fiduciary duties of a lawyer to her client? In 1953, 
HenryS. Drinker quoted then Ethical Canon 11 when he wrote about the lawyer 
as fiduciary: 
[t]he lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his personal 
benefit or gain he abuses or takes advantage of the confidence reposed 
in him by his client. Money of the client or collected for the client or 
other trust property coming into the possession of the lawyer should 
be reported and accounted forpromptly.16 
Drinker also made the point that the lawyer's fiduciary duty is particularly 
strong when the client is borderline competent. "While the lawyer may act for 
such a one whom he honestly believes to be competent, he owes him a special 
duty not to overreach him."17 This applies to the lawyer not only as a general 
fiduciary but also when the lawyer takes on the specific mantle of "statutory 
fiduciary" as executor or guardian. 
15. Spurgeon & Ciccarello, The Lawyer in Other Fiduciary Roles, supra note 9, 
at 1359. While the Author generally agrees with the proposition that lawyers are "well-
suited" to serve as fiduciaries, they are currently trained to be much more the "zealous 
litigator/advocate" who implements the decisions of the client rather than the fiduciary 
who often must make independent judgments on behalf of a deceased or incompetent 
client. See generally Paula A. Monopoli, Teaching Lawyers to Be More than Zealous 
Advocates, 2001 WIS. L. REv. 1159. 
16. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL Ennes Canon 11 (1908), cited in HENRYS. 
DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 89 (1953). 
17. DRINKER, supra note 16, at 93. 
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Fiduciary relationships include "trustee and beneficiary, guardian and ward, 
agent and principal, attorney and client, executor or administrator and legatees 
and next of kin of the decedent."18 In addition to the general attorney/client 
relationship, lawyers who assume the mantle of"statutory fiduciary" --executor, 
trustee, or guardian--overlay a more specific dimension onto their general 
fiduciary duty. 19 Each of these associations may vary in the depth and nature of 
the confidential relationships involved and the fiduciary duties that arise, but 
they all are premised on the duty of loyalty that arises when one reposes trust 
and confidence in another. As Austin Scott noted in his 1949 article, The 
Fiduciary Principle: 
[t]he greater the independent authority to be exercised by the 
fiduciary, the greater the scope of his fiduciary duty. Thus, a trustee 
is under a stricter duty ofloyalty than is an agent upon whom limited 
authority is conferred or a corporate director who can act only as a 
member of the board of directors or a promoter acting for investors in 
a new corporation. All of these, however, are fiduciaries and are 
subject to the fiduciary principle of loyalty, although not to the same 
extent.20 
What are the ethical problems and practical risks associated with attorneys 
acting as fiduciaries as opposed to simply attorneys? They may not be obvious 
to most clients at first. If a lawyer actually drafts the instrument that names him 
or her as personal representative, that act may raise issues later when the lawyer 
is paid a fee as personal representative. If the client is weak or frail, there may 
be the specter of the lawyer exercising undue influence in pushing the client to 
name him or her as fiduciary. If a lawyer represents the client before the client 
dies and the lawyer becomes the personal representative post-death, new duties 
arise to the client's children, grandchildren, and any other heirs or beneficiaries. 
This kind of "multiple representation" often generates serious conflicts of 
interest-real or imagined-in the lawyer/fiduciary. 
As noted previously, there has been minimal scholarly attention given to this 
issue although there have been some discussions among academics and 
practitioners over the years. The bulk of the existing literature was brought 
together in Professor Spurgeon and Attorney Ciccarello's 1994 article.21 They 
18. Austin Scott, The Fiduciary Principle, 37 CAL. L. REv. 539, 541 (1949). 
19. Note that Spurgeon and Ciccarello discuss whether the ethical rules applying 
to attorneys extend to attorneys acting as specific fiduciaries. Spurgeon & Ciccarello, 
The Lawyer in Other Fiduciary Roles, supra note 9, at 1366-67. 
20. Scott, supra note 18, at 541. 
21. See Spurgeon & Ciccarello, The Lawyer in Other Fiduciary Roles, supra note 
9; see also DRINKER, supra note 16; Luther J. A very, The Rules of Professional Conduct 
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cited the proceedings of an October 1972 conference at which Professor Alan 
Polasky hosted a panel of trusts and estates partners from law firms in Michigan, 
New York, and Boston.22 Polasky characterized the issue oflawyers serving as 
executors and trustees as a "subject of major importance, both in terms of service 
to clients and in terms of the risk which attorneys may incur.'023 Several authors 
have noted the lack of cases in which courts have disciplined attorneys for 
naming themselves as fiduciaries in the instruments they draft.24 The fact that 
for Lawyers Are ConfUsing, 131 TR. & EST. 8 (Apr. 1992); Ronald Chester, The Lawyer 
as Charitable Fiduciary: Public Trust or Private Gain, 25 PAC. L.J. 1353 (1994); 
Bradley R. Cook, New Developments Alter the Role ofEstatePlanners in Recommending 
Fiduciaries, 16 EST. PLAN. 356 (Nov./Dec. 1989); Frank Coolidge, New Avenues for 
Lawyers Boasts Old Tradition, 128 TR. & EsT. 20 (Dec. 1989); Joseph W. deFuria, Jr., 
A Matter of Ethics Ignored: The Attorney-Draftsman as Testamentary Fiduciary, 36 U. 
KAN. L. REv. 275 (1988); Edgar C. Gentile, ill, Lawyers as Executors and Trustees: 
Snakes and Ladders, 48 ALA. LAW. 94 (1987); William D. Haught, Attorneys Take 
Fiduciary Roles, 127 TR. &EST. 10 (Feb. 1988); Gerald P. Johnston, An Ethical AnalysiS 
of Common Estate Planning Practices-Is Good Business Bad Ethics?, 45 OmoST.L.J. 
57 (1984); Louis D. Laurino, The Duties and Responsibilities of the Attorney/Fiduciary, 
19 U. MIAMI PHILIP E. HECKERLING lNST. ON EST. PLAN.~ 1601.2 (John T. Gaubatz ed., 
1985); Lawyers Serving as Executors and Trustees, 7 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 745 
(1972) (Alan N. Polansky, Moderator, Seminar on The Lawyer's Role and Compensation 
in Estates and Trusts); Leonard Levin, Legal Ramifications ofUnethical Estate Practices, 
124 TR. & EST. 47 (Oct. 1985); Ronald C. Link, Developments Regarding the 
Professional Responsibility of the Estate Planning Lawyer: The Effect of the Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct, 22 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 1 (1987); William M. 
McGovern, Jr., Undue Influence and Professional Responsibility, 28 REAL PROP. PROB. 
& TR. J. 643 (1994) (See, in particular, pages 668-73 "Part C. The Drafter as 
Fiduciary."); Recommendations of the Conference, supra note 1 0; Report of the Special 
Study Committee on Professional Responsibility, Preparation of Wills and Trusts That 
Name Drafting Lawyer as Fiduciary, 28 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 803 (1994) 
[hereinafter Report of the Special Study Committee]; Spurgeon & Ciccarello, Report of 
the Working Group, supra note 1 0; Nancy Stranger Wood, Selection of Fiduciaries and 
the Role of the Attorney Draftsperson, Ethical Considerations, AdminiStrative Powers, 
Simultaneous Death, and Tax Apportionment, in Handling Your First Basic Will-i 992, 
at 207-08 (PLI Tax & Estate Planning Course Handbook Series No. 04-5236, 1992); 
Debra T. Landis, Annotation, Conduct of Attorney in Capacity of Executor or 
AdminiStrator of Decedents Estate as Ground for DiSciplinary Action, 92 A.L.R.3d 655 
(1979); Frank D. Wagner, Annotation, Attorneys at Law: DiSciplinary Proceeding 
Based upon Attorney's Naming of Himself or Associate as Executor or Attorney for 
Executor in Will Drafted by Him, 51 A.L.R.3d 703 (1974). 
22. Lawyers Serving as Executors and Trustees, supra note 21. 
23. Lawyers Serving as Executors and Trustees, supra note 21, at 745. 
24. Wagner, supra note 21, at 705 (Although not disciplining the ''two attorneys, 
a brother and sister who practiced as partners ... court said its opinion was intended to 
establish guidelines for future disciplinary proceedings .•• the lawyer as scrivener must 
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this is a common-but-ethically-problematic practice has given rise to several 
proposed models to constrain attorneys who might engage in it. 
A. First Model-An "Absolute" Prohibition Model 
The first of these models-an absolute prohibition against lawyers ever 
naming themselves as fiduciaries-is laid out clearly in Professor Joseph deFuria 
Jr.'s article, A Matter of Ethics Ignored: The Attorney-Draftsman as 
Testamentary Fiduciary.25 Professor deFuria noted that: 
[ o ]ne of the more troublesome practices, which has received 
surprisingly little attention in the literature, is that of the attorney who 
drafts a will that names him as a testamentary fiduciary. It is both 
common knowledge and well-documented that lawyers in many 
jurisdictions routinely serve as fiduciaries under wills that they have 
drawn.26 
The revenue-generating aspects of such an appointment and the vulnerability of 
often elderly clients raise a host of possible ethical pitfalls with the practice. 
After reviewing the paucity of ethics committee opinions and court 
decisions on the matter, Professor deFuria also criticized the 1983 ABA Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct as they apply to this issue. He questioned 
whether the profession's tolerance for the practice should be reconsidered and 
then proposed a model that he believed "would resolve the ethical problems 
implicit in the drafting practice. "27 
Professor deFuria noted the ABA Committee on Significant Developments 
in Probate and Trust Law Practice's criticism of the Model Rules and their lack 
of specificity with regard to "estate practice ethics, and fiduciary designations 
in particular. "28 fu Professor de Furia's view, this lack of specificity "underscores 
both rules' inadequacy for policing the practice. . . . fu fact, the effect of the 
be especially careful that he does not in any way suggest or insinuate that he be 
appointed in a fiduciary capacity." (citing State v. Gulbankian, 196 N.W.2d 733 (Wis. 
1972))); see also Landis, supra note 21, at 658-59; Philip White, Jr., Annotation, 
Attorneys at Law: Disciplinary Proceedings for Drafting Instrument Such as Will or 
Trust Under Which Attorney Drafter or Member of Attorney's Family or Law Firm Is 
Beneficiary, Grantee, Legatee, or Devisee, 80 A.L.R.Sth 597, 609-12 (2000). 
25. deFuria, Jr., supra note 21. 
26. deFuria, Jr., supra note 21, at 276. 
27. deFuria, Jr., supra note 21, at 278. 
28. deFuria, Jr., supra note 21, at 298 (citing Link et al., Developments Regarding 
the Professional Responsibility of the Estate Planning Lawyer: The Effect of the Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct, 22 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 1, 2 (1987)). 
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Model Rules is to grant attorneys virtually free license to engage in the practice 
of drafting testamentary instruments in which they name themselves 
fiduciaries. '029 
Professor deFuria characterized attorneys engaged in such practice as 
ignoring "serious problems of conflict of interest, overreaching, undue influence 
and solicitation inherent in the drafting practice. The fact that such conduct is 
not forbidden under the ethics codes does not make the practice proper, since 
even scrupulously ethical behavior will not attenuate the potential for an 
appearance ofimpropriety.mo 
In response to these observations, Professor deFuria essentially offered an 
"absolute prohibition" model. In his view, the rule should be that: 
an attorney is absolutely precluded from drafting a testamentary 
instrument in which he is named as a fiduciary. Furthermore, any 
lawyer who drafts such an instrument would not be permitted to serve 
in a "fiduciary capacity thereunder. Finally, if a client insists that his 
regular attorney serve in a fiduciary capacity under his will, the 
document would have to be drafted by a truly independent attorney. 31 
Professor deFuria observed that "[ d]espite the potential for abuse, lawyers 
continue to act as fiduciaries under wills that they have drafted, perhaps because 
relatively few courts, ethics committees, or commentators have seriously 
questioned such behavior.m2 
B. Second Model-Increased Judicial Scrutiny Prior to Appointment 
The second model-increased judicial scrutiny prior to initial 
appointment-was delineated by Professor Gerald Johnston. In his article, An 
Ethical Analysis of Common Estate Planning Practices-Is Good Business Bad 
Ethics?/3 Professor Johnston noted that: 
the practice exists among attorneys in certain areas of the country to 
name themselves as executors in wills that they draft . . . an attorney 
qua executor can, in a particular estate, "earn" a fee that is well 
beyond what that same attorney might receive for the performance of 
29. deFuria, Jr., supra note 21, at 298-99. 
30. deFuria, Jr., supra note 21, at 300. 
31. deFuria, Jr., supra note 21, at 309. 
32. deFuria, Jr., supra note 21, at 277. 
33. Johnston, supra note 21. 
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comparable legal services involving the same expenditure of time and 
effort.34 
Professor Johnston reviewed the ethical problems raised by this practice, 
including conflicts of interest and improper solicitation. He noted that the risks 
of overreaching vis a vis an existing client may be even greater than with a new 
client, given the relationship of trust and confidence between the old client and 
the attorney. Like Professor deFuria, Professor Johnston highlighted the 
retrenchment in the ABA's Model Rules, which dropped the prior (and more 
specific) Ethical Consideration 5-6 ("EC 5-6") of the ABA's prior Model Code 
ofProfessional Responsibility ("Model Code"), which prohibited a lawyer from 
"consciously influencing" a client to name him as fiduciary or lawyer in the 
instrument. 35 
In his article, Professor Johnston analyzed a number of ethics opinions in 
the area, including one from the New York Committee on Professional Ethics 
that interpreted the phrase "'consciously influence"' to mean "substantially less 
psychological pressure than 'undue influence. "'36 The Committee did find some 
circumstances in which it might be ethical for a lawyer to suggest himself or 
herself. For example, these might include situations where the parties "had a 
long term relationship."37 Estate of WeinstocR8 was an example of a court's 
finding that lawyer/executors were guilty of "impropriety and overreaching" 
when the two attorneys (father and son) had just met the testator who "had not 
independently and freely designated the attorneys to be his executors."39 The 
court based its decision on the old Model Code's EC 5-6, adopted by New York 
in its own state ethics code.40 
Professor Johnston concluded that, "all things considered, much can be said 
from an ethical standpoint for an absolute prohibition of the designation of an 
attorney-draftsman as executor or trustee."41 However, he offered an alternative 
solution. Rather than an absolute ban on lawyer/scriveners acting as fiduciaries, 
Professor Johnston suggested that: 
34. Johnston, supra note 21, at 86-87. 
35. Johnston, supra note 21, at 91. 
36. Johnston, supra note 21, at 92 (citing N.Y. Comm. on Profl Ethics, Op. 481 
(1978)). 
37. Johnston, supra note 21, at 92. 
38. 351 N.E.2d 647 (N.Y. 1976). 
39. Johnston, supra note 21, at 93. 
40. Johnston, supra note 21, at 93. 
41. Johnston, supra note 21, at 97. 
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a lawyer who has been designated as executor or testamentary trustee 
in a will that he or she has drawn could be required, after [the] death 
of the testator, to prove that the decedent did in fact request that the 
attorney-draftsman act in a fiduciary capacity, and that the scrivener 
did not improperly influence the testator in this regard.42 
321 
This would, at a minimum, prevent such an attorney from being appointed in 
cases where he or she did not know the testator before drafting the will. 
Specifically, Professor Johnston would offer beneficiaries the opportunity 
for input at the initial stages of the probate court proceedings. Even if the 
beneficiaries did not bring a complaint, the court could take a proactive approach 
in reviewing the attorney's conduct, as beneficiaries often are not familiar with 
the process or the issues. As Professor Johnston noted, "an attorney's conduct 
may be subject to question from an ethical standpoint even though private parties 
decide not to challenge the appointment."43 
Professor Johnston observed that such additional inquizy and procedures 
on the part of the probate court "may seem inconsistent with the spirit of the 
Uniform Probate Code with its emphasis on limited judicial involvement and 
informal probate administration." He argued correctly, however, that it only 
would apply to draftsmen who name themselves as fiduciaries and, thus, only 
would affect a small number of wills offered for probate. In conjunction with 
are-enactment of the old Model Code's EC 5-6, Professor Johnston saw his two-
pronged model as a way to deter attorneys from naming themselves in 
inappropriate cases. 44 
C. Third Model-Increased Judicial Scrutiny Prior to 
and After Appointment 
As if to buttress Professor Johnston's point from a "real world" perspective, 
Judge Louis Laurino, a Surrogate (Probate Judge) of Queens County, New York, 
delivered a scathing indictment of lawyers who act as fiduciaries at a major 
estate planning institute.45 In his remarks, Judge Laurino noted the 1975 ABA 
Statement of Principles regarding probate practice. In particular, he recited 
42. Johnston, supra note 21, at 99. 
43. Johnston, supra note 21, at 99-100. 
44. Johnston, supra note 21, at 100. 
45. Laurino, supra note 21, '1!1600. The readers should note that some might 
observe that Judge Laurino is an interested party in the probate process and that probate 
judges might be expected to prefer more oversight rather than less given their role. 
While this may be true, it does not mean that such changes may not also be necessary 
from an objective perspective. 
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Principle #4, which "sets forth ... that an attorney may serve both as a personal 
representative of a decedent's estate as well as counsel to the personal 
representative and may receive reasonable compensation for his aggregate 
services and responsibilities."46 Judge Laurino sharply criticized this rule and 
stated that it was his opinion that Principle #4 perpetuated the practice of dual 
roles "for the sake of profit rather than remedy one of the primary causes for 
justifiable public criticism of the legal profession in the settlement of decedent's 
estates."47 He took particular aim at "the attorney who has himself named 
executor in a will he drafts and thereafter acts as a fiduciary."48 
Judge Laurino echoed the alarm at the then newly-revised ABA Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct, which eliminated EC 5-6. Judge Laurino made 
it clear that he vehemently disagreed with the ABA Committee that drafted the 
new Model Rules, when it included a comment that: 
the provisions of EC 5-6 regarding the appointment of 
attorney/fiduciary/draftsman are adequately covered by the general 
conflict of interest provision of Model Rule 1. 7 and the specific 
provisions of Rule 1.7(a) which provides that a lawyer should not 
enter into a business transaction with his client unless the transaction 
is fair and equitable to the client.49 
Judge Laurino made the point in his speech that he believed that this 
retrenchment in the Model Rules was a serious mistake. 
Judge Laurino, like many other commentators, was struck by the lack of 
decisional authority on the issue. He said that he had "found little information 
in the way of hard data concerning the extent to which lawyers serve as 
executors or administrators" but found the little information available "very 
enlightening."50 The 1975 American Bar Foundation study on the issue found 
that: 
an attorney served as personal representative or as co-fiduciary in 11 
percent of Florida estates, 10 percent of Maryland estates and 10 
percent of Massachusetts estates. By contrast, an attorney served as 
personal representative in only 2 percent of the Texas estates and less 
than 1 percent of California estates. This stark contrast was attributed 
46. Laurino, supra note 21, '111600 (citing 1975 ABA Statement of Principles, 
Reports of ABA, 1201-1207, 1205 (1975)). 
47. Laurino, supra note 21, '111600. 
48. Laurino, supra note 21, '1!1600. 
49. Laurino, supra note 21, '111601.1. 
50. Laurino, supra note 21, '1!1601.2. 
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to the fact that the case law of both California and Texas follow the 
majority common law rule that in the absence of [a] statute which 
provides otherwise, an executor or administrator is not generally 
entitled to extra compensation for legal services rendered by him in 
connection with the estate. Needless to say, nether Texas nor 
California have legislation permitting double compensation whereas 
the laws of Florida, Maryland and Massachusetts do permit it. 51 
323 
In his remarks to the institute audience, Judge Laurino made the connection 
between the double-dipping allowed in some states and the willingness of 
lawyers to serve as fiduciaries. He rejected the argument that lawyers act as 
fiduciaries for motives other than money. 
Judge Laurino described how he had begun to keep statistics in his own 
New York courtroom as to how many attorneys were acting as fiduciaries. 52 His 
own results comported with those. of the American Bar Foundation study. "Ten 
percent of the probate filings in [his] court involved an 
attorney/fiduciary/draftsman."53 Like Professor Johnston, Judge Laurino rejected 
an absolute prohibition model as the solution to the problem of self-interested 
attorneys acting out of profit rather than fiduciary concern for their clients. 54 
Judge Laurino embraced a model of "increased judicial scrutiny" at the time of 
appointment but modified that model by adding a limited amount of continuing 
judicial scrutiny in terms of such attorneys having to file additional accounts-an 
"increased judicial scrutiny with teeth" model. 
Judge Laurino made the case that, in some instances, the client's long-time 
attorney is the best guardian of the client's interests and is the right choice as 
fiduciary. However, his experience as a probate court judge had shown him that 
"the true abuses of professional standards [arise from] the appointment of [an] 
attorney/draftsman who is otherwise a stranger to the testator, not the friend, 
relative or long time advisor."55 Judge Laurino noted that in the first forty 
probates he kept track of in 1984, twenty-four had simple estates 'vith family 
members who were capable of taking on the role of executor. 56 Judge Laurino 
expressed frustration with the fact that he, as a judicial officer, was not able to 
give the beneficiaries of such estates a good answer to the question of why "the 
decedent chose to appoint the attorney/draftsman as executor and in seven 
instances the attorney's partner as an alternate or co-executor [when there were 
51. Laurino, supra note 21, ~ 1601.2. 
52. Laurino, supra note 21, ~ 1601.2. 
53. Laurino, supra note 21, ~ 1601.2. 
54. Laurino, supra note 21, ~ 1601.3. 
55. L.aurino, supra note 21, ~ 1601.3. 
56. Laurino, supra note 21, ~ 1601.3. 
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family members who were capable of performing the duties] and thus add 
commissions to the adm.inistration."57 
Bec.ause most estates in his court were settled by means of a "Receipt and 
Release" (as are probably the majority of estates in the nation's probate courts), 
statutory requirements that the court review and set the attorney's fee were of 
little pmctical value in safeguarding against overreaching.58 Judge Laurino 
suggested first and foremost that courts begin to keep statewide records of all 
appointments of attorneys as executor/administrators. Such record keeping is 
useful to identify repeat offenders and provide a "chilling effect to future 
wrongdoers."59 
Judge Laurino also required in his court "that the decree appointing the 
attorney/fiduciary provide that he or she must account within one year after the 
date of the decree if the size of the taxable estate is below the federal taxable 
limit and within two years if it is above the federal taxable limit."60 Judge 
Laurino created this rule on his own. But, in his opinion, "an attorney because 
of his professional responsibility is under higher duty of care and his 
performance is subject to closer scrutiny by the court than the ordinary 
layman."61 Therefore, Judge Laurino felt that the compulsory accounting he 
required was "well within the discretionary power of the court to regulate the 
performance of its officers, the attorney/fiduciary."62 He viewed it as his "way 
of insuring that those attorneys who insist on acting as fiduciary will do so 
properly and expeditiously."63 
Judge Laurino concluded his remarks by offering a model that presumes 
that: 
absent a family relationship, every attorney/fiduciary who is also the 
dmftsman of the will should be under a duty to explain his nomination 
in a plenary hearing. His refusal or his failure to satisfactorily explain 
the circumstances and show that the nomination was freely and 
willingly made, should give rise to a presumption, or at very least, an 
inference that his nomination was the product of undue influence.64 
57. Laurino, supra note 21, 'i[160 1.3. 
58. Laurino, supra note 21, '111601.3. 
59. Laurino, supra note 21, '1!1601.3. 
60. Laurino, supra note 21, 'il1601.3. 
61. Laurino, supra note 21, 'il1601.3. 
62. Laurino, supra note 21, 'il160 1.3. 
63. Laurino, supra note 21, '1!1601.3. 
64. Laurino, supra note 21, '1!1601.3. 
HeinOnline -- 67 Mo. L. Rev. 325 2002
2002] FIDUCIARY DUTY 325 
Judge Laurino aclmowledged, however, that the current ethical and 
doctrinal approach across the country is that "the mere fact that an attorney is 
designated executor by a will he drafted does not in and of itself give rise to a 
presumption of undue influence."65 Judge Laurino concluded that: 
an attorney draftsman should only serve as fiduciary at the unsolicited 
suggestion ofhis client and ifhe agrees to serve, he should realize that 
there are grave legal, ethical and practical problems that he may have 
to overcome in order to perform his duties as a fiduciary and as an 
attorney.66 
Some of Judge Laurino's concerns were addressed in Section 2307-a of the 
Surrogate's Court Procedure Act, signed into law on August 2, 1995, by New 
York Governor George Pataki. That recent statute provides that: 
when an attorney prepares a will to be proved in the courts of this state 
and such attorney or a then affiliated attorney is therein an executor-
designee, the testator shall be informed prior to the execution of the 
will that: 
(a) subject to limited statutory exceptions, any person, including an 
attorney, is eligible to serve as an executor; 
(b) absent an agreement to the contrary, any person, including an 
attorney, who serves as an executor is entitled to receive an executor's 
statutory commissions; and 
(c) if such attorney or an affiliated attorney renders legal services in 
connection with the executor's official duties, such attorney or a then 
affiliated attorney is entitled to receive just and reasonable 
compensation for such legal services, in addition to the executor's 
statutory commissions. 67 
The statute also requires that the testator aclmowledge receiving this 
disclosure as to dual compensation in writing. 68 In connection with state69 and 
local70 court rules, this statute goes a long way toward full implementation of a 
65. Laurino, supra note 21,, 1601.3. 
66. Laurino, supra note 21,, 1603. 
67. N.Y. SURR. Cr. PROC.ACfLAW § 2307-a(1)(a)-(c) (McKinney 1997). 
68. N.Y. SURR. Cr. PROC. Acr LAW§ 2307-a (McKinney 1997). 
69. N.Y. UNIFORM RULES FORSURR. Cr. § 207.52 (McKinney 2002). In addition, 
Section 207.52 of the New York Uniform Rules for Surrogate's Court provides that 
attorneys who are sole executors and who are also acting as counsel for the estate must 
file an affidavit that reveals their fees and the commissions paid to them or their firms. 
70. N.Y. QUEENS COUNTY SURR. Cr. RULES § 1858.1 (McKinney 2002); N.Y. 
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model that discourages dual roles in inappropriate cases while increasing 
scrutiny of drafting attorneys who nanie themselves as executors. 
Spurgeon and Ciccarello noted that some lawyers have little concern about 
attorneys acting as fiduciaries, emphasizing that, in an era of tough competition, 
the number of those Americans needing fiduciaries is increasing and taking on 
the role of fiduciary is a way to expand one's practice.71 There are, however, 
many in the legal profession and in academia who realize that, while the 
profession should encourage the use of well-trained lawyer/fiduciaries given the 
increasing demographic and structural needs (due in part to the loss of traditional 
bank trust services) there must be increased protection for those vulnerable 
clients who rely on their trustworthiness in doing so. The scent of undue 
influence hangs heavy over drafting attorneys, in particular, who name 
themselves in their clients' wills or trusts as the fiduciary. Professor Jeffrey 
Pennell, of the Emory University Law School, cited an attorney that he greatly 
admires, Floyd McGown, for the rule of thumb that a smart lawyer should not 
"accept service as a fiduciary in a trust or will created by a client. "72 While there 
may well be appropriate cases, "the practical reality is that being named as a 
fiduciary or as an attorney for a fiduciary [in the will itself] raises eyebrows; the 
presumption 'is that [an] impropriety resulted in the designation unless the 
attorney can establish otherwise.'773 
New York Attorney Joshua Rubenstein echoed this sentiment: 
[a]ttorneys who have represented individuals and families over a 
period of many years are frequently uniquely qualified to serve as 
executors for such individuals. Indeed, it is the norm rather than the 
exception in England and in certain parts of the United States, in 
particular the Boston area, for attorneys to serve as executors. In New 
York, however, the phrase "attorney/executor'' or "attorney/fiduciary" 
might be uttered in the same breath as "carpetbagger" with the result 
SUFFOLKCOUNTYSURR. Cr.RULES §§ 1850.6(b ), 1850.10 (McKinney2002). In Suffolk 
County and Queens County, the local rules go even further, providing that where the will 
nominated an attorney as a fiduciary, the attorney must file an affidavit with the probate 
petition setting forth the testator's reasons for nominating the attorney to serve as 
fiduciary. 
71. Spurgeon & Ciccarello, The Lawyer in Other Fiduciary Roles, supra note 9, 
at 1368 n.47 (citing several articles in which "[s]ome commentators have also pointed 
out that for business reasons, lawyers should accept opportunities to be a fiduciary, as the 
changing nature of estate planning law is curtailing the amount oflegal work needed in 
the field"). 
72. Jeffrey N. Pennell, Ethics, Professionalism, and Malpractice Issues in Estate 
Planning and Administration, SC 75 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 67, 168 (June 14, 1998). 
73. /d. at 166. 
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that the nomination of an attorney as an executor is regarded by many 
as presumptively bad. The fact of the matter is that in no other area of 
the law is the abuse, and the potential for abuse, so great as in the area 
of attorney/executors, who have temporary legal title to assets that 
belong beneficially to someone else. 74 
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The profession could allay the public distrust of lawyer/fiduciaries if it 
embraced either the first model-an "absolute prohibition" on 
attorney/draftspersons-or a "disclosure" model, which combines the increased 
judicial scrutiny of the second and third models with the placement of the burden 
on the drafting attorney to prove disclosure and informed consent. This model 
would give courts the discretion to order continuing supervision of 
lawyer/fiduciaries in appropriate cases. However, it would treat drafting 
attorneys who name themselves as personal representatives differently from 
those naming themselves as trustees. To achieve the greatest impact in reducing 
drafting lawyer/fiduciary malfeasance, this embrace of a revised ethical rule in 
the area should be done in conjunction with amendments to the procedural rules 
governing the appointment and removal of fiduciaries under the UPC and the 
UTC. In addition, pursuing legislative change regarding attorney fees in such 
cases, as well as implementing random audits, improving the safety net for the 
victims of such attorneys when damage results, and better educating clients, is 
imperative. 
III. REFORMING THE ABA MODEL RULES 
Presumably, ethical codes are meant to enforce professional norms and 
avoid harm to clients or patients. The specific harms to be concerned with in the 
lawyer/draftsperson/fiduciary context include impinging on client autonomy (and 
balancing that risk with the preservation of clients' freedom to contract \vith a 
fiduciary of their choice). The harms also include the reputational cost to the 
legal profession as a whole imposed by systemic failures to protect individual 
client autonomy. In addition, the monitoring problems \vith lawyer/fiduciaries 
are increased when neither family members nor the probate court is given a 
significant oversight role in the process. The risk of breach of the fundamental 
fiduciary duty of loyalty and perhaps outright theft are all increased in a system 
allowing untrammeled freedom to name one's own fiduciary but lacking 
disclosure and informed consent as elements of that model. 
The ethical rules that govern lawyers frown upon the act of asking one's 
client to name one as executor. Historically, the profession's position was that, 
74. Joshua S. Rubenstein, Compensation of Attorney/Executors: Practitioners 
Often Caught Between Scylla and Charybdis, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 29, 1996, at 9. 
HeinOnline -- 67 Mo. L. Rev. 328 2002
328 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67 
"so long as the client originally had the idea for the attorney to serve as 
fiduciary, then there were no ethical violations."75 The advent of the Model 
Code of Professional Responsibility-a set of ethical aspirations and 
prohibitions-in 1969 set the stage for a more precise explication of the 
profession's concern about solicitation in this realm. EC 5-6 provided that: "a 
lawyer should not consciously influence a client to name him as executor, trustee 
or lawyer in such instrument. In those cases where a client wishes to name his 
lawyer as such, care should be taken by the lawyer to avoid even the appearance 
of impropriety.m6 But ethical considerations were not prohibitions-they were 
merely goals to which lawyers were to aspire. 77 
The more recent ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct stripped that 
provision out of the new ethical paradigm. The ABA subsumed the issue under 
the more general conflict of interest rules in Rules 1. 7 and 1.8. An original draft 
contained a note in the Commentary that a lawyer should not seek to have 
himself named in an instrument as executor, but the note was dropped from the 
final rules. 78 The profession's ethical rules seem to have retrenched in protecting 
elderly and otherwise susceptible clients from those few unscrupulous lawyers 
who might prey upon them by insinuating themselves into their last wills and 
testaments. 
The December 1993 Fordham University School of Law conference was 
a significant event in terms of the working group reports and the scholarship that 
came out of the meeting.79 Edward D. Spurgeon and Mary Jane Ciccarello's 
conference article essentially embraced the third model with improved disclosure 
75. Spurgeon & Ciccarello, The Lawyer in Other Fiduciary Roles, supra note 9, 
at 1376. As Spurgeon and Ciccarello have noted, the 1908 Canons of Professional 
Responsibility, the precursor to the Model Code, were not seen as prohibiting the practice 
oflawyers acting as executors. Spurgeon & Ciccarello, The Lawyer in Other Fiduciary 
Roles, supra note 9, at 1376. Spurgeon and Ciccarello cite words by HenryS. Drinker 
and Joseph A. deFuria, both of whom note the lack of concern about lawyers serving as 
fiduciaries. See Spurgeon & Ciccarello, The Lawyer in Other Fiduciary Roles, supra 
note 9, at 1375 n.73, 1376 n.74. 
76. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L REsPONSffiiLITY EC 5-6 (1969), reprinted in JOHNS. 
DZIENKOWSKI, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSffiiLITY STANDARDS, RULES & STATUTES 429 
(West Grouped., 1998-99) (1959). Note that this Article focuses on the role of ABA 
Model Rules, but there are other sources oflaw that inform the ethical rules in this area, 
including The American Law Institute's Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing 
Lawyers. For a list of all these sources, see Report of the Special Study Committee, supra 
note 21, at 806-07. 
77. Spurgeon & Ciccarello, The Lawyer in Other Fiduciary Roles, supra note 9, 
at 1376. 
78. Spurgeon & Ciccarello, The Lawyer in Other Fiduciary Roles, supra note 9, 
at 1377 (citingMODELRULESOFPROF'LCONDUCfR. 1.8 (Proposed Final Draft 1981)). 
79. See Spurgeon & Ciccarello, Report of the Working Group, supra note 10. 
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and monitoring safeguards in place. 80 They endorsed the idea of revising the 
Model Rules to be more well-defined in this area and to offer more guidance to 
lawyer/fiduciaries. However, in the midst of a comprehensive review of the oft-
criticized Model Rules in this area seven years later, it appears that the Ethics 
2000 proposals will not only fail to revive the more specific guidance lost when 
EC 5-6 was written out in 1983 but may take the Model Rules from an arguably 
neutral position on the issue to one that expressly allows lawyers to "seek" such 
appointments. 
As the Model Rules no longer specifically address lawyers being named as 
and acting in the role of fiduciary, the result has been that lawyers now have less 
explicit guidance about assuming the role of executor or trustee than they did 
under the Model Code prior to 1983. The major five-year review of the Model 
Rules by the Ethics 2000 Commission entertained a wide variety of changes to 
the Model Rules. The Commission issued its four-hundred-page final report on 
November 27, 2000.81 While the report suggested hundreds of changes to the 
Model Rules, none of these changes would replace the language of EC 5-6, 
deleted from the 1983 Model Rules. In fact, these proposed revisions would 
raise the serious questions of whether the profession now explicitly permits 
solicitation of clients by lawyers seeking to be fiduciaries. 
In May of2001, the Authorposed a question to members of the Ethics 2000 
Commission as to whether any group had proposed reviving the Model Code's 
EC 5-6 that "a lawyer should not consciously influence a client to name him as 
executor, trustee or lawyer in an instrument." The Reporter for the Commission 
responded that: 
[t]he Commission is recommending that the text of Rule 1.8(c) be 
amended to prohibit lawyers from soliciting "any substantial gift from 
a client including a testamentary gift." A new Comment [8] will 
provide as follows: "This Rule does not prohibit a lawyer from 
seeking to have the lawyer or a partner or associate of the lawyer 
named as executor of the client's estate or to another potentially 
lucrative fiduciary position. Nevertheless, such appointments will be 
subject to the general conflict of interest provision in Rule 1. 7 when 
there is a significant risk that the lawyer's interest in obtaining the 
appointment will materially limit the lawyer's independent 
professional judgment in advising the client concerning the choice of 
an executor or other fiduciary. In obtaining the client's informed 
80. Spurgeon & Ciccarello, The Lawyer in Other Fiduciary Roles, supra note 9, 
at 1357. 
81. James Podgers, New ABA Model Rules May Be Under Construction in the Next 
Few Months, 87 ABAJ.58(May2001). 
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consent to the conflict, the lawyer should advise the client concerning 
the nature and extent of the lawyer's financial interest in the 
appointment, as well as the availability of alternative candidates for 
the position. 82 
Rather than reinstating the explicit prohibition against consciously 
influencing a client to name one as a fiduciary, the new commentary actually 
states that "this Rule does not prohibit a lawyer from seeking to have the lawyer 
or a partner or associate of the lawyer named as executor of the client's estate or 
to another potentially lucrative fiduciary position."83 This is rather remarkable 
language, as it does not prohibit lawyers from seeking to have their clients name 
them as a fiduciary.84 "Seeking" is synonymous with "soliciting,"85 so the 
provision may fairly be read to mean that it will be acceptable for a lawyer to 
suggest that a client name him or her as a fiduciary in the will that the lawyer is 
drafting. That is contrary to the prior understanding that, while a drafting 
attorney may serve as a fiduciary, it is not ethical for the lawyer to solicit -read 
seek-such appointment. (It is in direct contradiction to EC 5-6 as described in 
a Reporter's Note dropped from the final commentary to Model Rule 1.8 that 
"EC 5-6 of the Code states that a lawyer should not seek to have himself or a 
partner or associate named in an instrument as executor of the client's estate.")86 
While this change in language simply may reflect what many lawyers are 
actually doing, in practice, such a sea change in the ethical tradition that frowns 
upon such solicitation only should have been made with a full and open 
82. Posting of Professor Nancy J. Moore, nmoore@bu.edu, Boston University 
School ofLaw, ChiefReporter, ABA Ethics 2000 Commission (May 18, 2001) during 
ABA Teleconference on the Ethics 2000 proposed revisions (copy on file with Author) 
(citing proposed revision to ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, available at 
www .abanet.org). In the Reporter's Explanation of Changes, the drafters state: 
This new Comment clarifies a present ambiguity by addressing the question 
of whether appointment of the lawyer or the lawyer's firm as executor 
constitutes a "substantial gift" within the meaning of this Rule. The 
commission believes that such appointments are not "gifts" but that they may 
create a conflict of interest between the client and the lawyer that would be 
governed by Rule 1.7. 
ABA Report, supra note 5. 
83. ABA Report, supra note 5. 
84. ABA Report, supra note 5. Note that the Comment does not specifically apply 
to drafting attorneys. It seems to allow all lawyers to seek to have themselves named as 
executor or any other lucrative fiduciary position. 
85. ROGET'S 21st CENTURY THEsAURUS 713 (2d ed. 1999). 
86. See Report of the Special Study Committee, supra note 21, at 803 n.14; supra 
note 76. 
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identification and discussion of this issue as an important change-standing 
separately and apart from the issue of gifts to lawyers. 87 
Ethics 2000 did better when it came to the second part of the Comment. 
The Commission did include a provision that such lawyer/fiduciary 
appointments are subject to conflict of interest rules under the Model Rules when 
there is a "significant risk that the lawyer's interest in obtaining the appointment 
will materially limit the lawyer's independentprofessionaljudgmentin advising 
the client concerning the choice of an executor or other fiduciary."88 The 
sentence is then linked to the next one, which only requires full disclosure when 
there is a conflict. However, such appointments are, in essence, always a per se 
conflict of interest when the attorney seeking appointment is also the drafting 
attorney. The situation is replete with "serious problems of conflict of interest, 
overreaching, undue influence, and solicitation."89 
The Author suggests that: (1) the rule should stand on its own (and not be 
simply an adjunct to a rule on gifts to lawyers, which is a related but 
conceptually separate matter); (2) it essentially should specify either in a Rule 
itself or in a Comment that a drafting attorney seeking such an appointment 
constitutes a per se conflict in this context-in other words, any time a lawyer 
is drafting the instrument that names him or her as a fiduciary, it is not up to the 
attorney to decide that there is a conflict, but rather, such a conflict exists in this 
situation, and there must be mandatory disclosure; and (3) that the phrase 
"executor'' should be changed to "personal representative" in keeping with the 
modem trend under the UPC.90 
ACTEC is an organization of lawyers expert in wills, trusts, and estate 
planning. Over the years, ACTEC has attempted to bridge the gap between the 
87. The Author has suggested to the Ethics 2000 Commission that the Comment 
could be changed to read: "This Rule does not prohibit a lawyer from accepting an 
appointment as executor or other potentially lucrative fiduciary :gosition." This would 
still effectuate the Commission's desire to clarify that such appointments do not 
constitute "gifts" but still preserve the ethical tradition of not allowing lawyers to "seek" 
such appointments. 
88. ABA Report, supra note 5. 
89. deFuria, Jr., supra note 21, at 299. For an extensive analysis of why a drafting 
attorney naming himself or herself as fiduciary in the instrument raises all of these issues, 
see deFuria, Jr., supra note 21, at 300-06. 
90. As noted above, the Author discussed with the Reporter for the Ethics 2000 
Commission, by e-mail, her concerns with the phrase "seek" and offered suggestions for 
alternative language. However, by the time the Author raised the concern in the Fall of 
2001, the proposed Rule 1.8 and Comment (c) already had been approved at the August 
2001 ABA Annual Meeting. The Ethics 2000 Reporter was thus understandably 
reluctant to revisit the issue at the February 2002 mid-year meeting of the ABA House 
of Delegates when the remainder of the Ethics 2000 proposals were to be debated. 
Perhaps this issue could be considered during a future review of the ABA Model Rules. 
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Model Rules-written with the zealous litigator in mind rather than lawyers 
acting in other roles-and the world of trusts and estates lawyers. ACTEC's 
comment on Model Rule 1. 7, written in 1985, prior to the Ethics 2000 revisions, 
and its effect on the issue of soliciting appointment as executor is as follows: 
An individual is generally free to select and appoint whomever he or 
she wishes to a fiduciary office (e.g., trustee, executor, attorney-in-
fact). None of the provisions of the MRPC deals explicitly with the 
propriety of a lawyer preparing for a client a will or document that 
appoints the lawyer to a fiduciary office. As a general proposition 
lawyers should be permitted to assist adequately informed clients who 
wish to appoint their lawyers as fiduciaries. Accordingly, a lawyer 
should be free to prepare a document that appoints the lawyer to a 
fiduciary office so long as the client is properly informed, the 
appointment does not violate the conflict of interest rules of the MRPC 
1. 7 ... and the appointment is not the product of undue influence or 
improper solicitation by the lawyer.91 
ACTEC goes on to define an informed client as one who is "provided with 
information regarding the role and duties of the fiduciary, the ability of the lay 
person to serve as fiduciary with legal and other professional assistance, and the 
comparative cost of appointing the lawyer or other person or institution as 
fiduciary."92 The Ethics 2000 Commission should be commended for including 
language in the new Comment to Rule 1.8( c) that appears to adopt a disclosure 
requirement similar to that posited by ACTEC as necessary to a "properly 
informed" client. The language states that: 
91. THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRUST & ESTATE COUNSEL, ACTEC 
COMMENTARIES ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 156 (3d ed. 
1999)[hereinafter ACTEC COMMENT ARIES], avail able at 
http://www .actecfoundation.orglpdfdocs/commenta1.PDF. 
92. /d. at 155-56. The ACTEC Commentary to Rule 1.7 also notes in the 
paragraph entitled Selection of Fiduciaries that: 
/d. 
The lawyer advising a client regarding the selection and appointment of a 
fiduciary should make full disclosure to the client of any benefits that the 
lawyer may receive as a result of the appointment. In particular, the lawyer 
should inform the client of any policies or practices known to the lawyer that 
the fiduciaries under consideration may follow with respect to the 
employment of the scrivener of an estate planning document as counsel for 
the fiduciary. The lawyer may also point out that a fiduciary has the right to 
choose any counsel it wishes. 
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[n]evertheless, such appointments will be subject to the general 
conflict of interest provision in Rule 1. 7 when there is a significant 
risk that the lawyer's interest in obtaining the appointment will 
materially limit the lawyer's independent professional judgment in 
advising the client concerning the choice of an executor or other 
fiduciary. In obtaining the client's informed consent to the conflict~ 
the lawyer should advise the client concerning the nature and extent 
of the lawyer's financial interest in the appointment, as well as the 
availability of alternative candidates for the position.93 
333 
Ethics 2000, in essence, has adopted the caveat, laid out by ACTEC in its 
Commentaries to the Model Rules, that, when discussing the appointment of a 
personal representative or trustee, the lawyer should properly inform the client 
of the issues involved94 The ABA's Section on Real Property, Probate and 
Trust Law's Principles for Attorneys Acting in Other Fiduciary Roles95 are 
similarly aimed at ensuring that attorneys chosen as fiduciaries protect their 
clients' interests by disclosure. For example, Principle 9, titled Role of the 
Attorney in Advising the Client, emphasized that, "[r]egardless of whether the 
attorney is named as a fiduciary, it is the responsibility of the attorney to advise 
the client as to the considerations affecting the choice of an appropriate 
fiduciary."96 
While endorsing Ethics 2000's embrace of the duty to disclose, the Author 
would change the Committee's disclosure provision to mandate that a "lawyer 
must advise the client," rather than "should" do so if the lawyer is also the 
draftsperson. The Comment also should be made into a free-standing rule and 
should not be subsumed as a mere Comment to Rule 1.8(c). Finally, it should 
include a proviso that an attorney who drafts an instrument that names him or her 
as a fiduciary constitutes a per se conflict and that such attorney does not have 
93. ABA Report, supra note 5. 
94. ACTEC COMMENTARIES, supra note 91, at 155-56. 
95. Principles for Attorneys Acting in Other Fiduciary Roles, 1992 A.B.A. SEC. 
REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. L., cited in Bradley R. Cook, Principles for Attorneys Acting 
in Other Fiduciary Roles, 6 PROB. & PROP., MarJApr. 1992, at 6. In an article seeking 
comments on the proposed Principles by Bradley R. Cook in the "For Your Information" 
section of Probate & Property, Cook stated that, while the Section Council of the 
American Bar Association Real Property, Probate and Trust Law Section believes that 
it is appropriate for a drafting attorney to act as an executor or trustee, "performing in 
such roles carries additional responsibilities and certain risks for the attorney, and no 
attorney should undertake to serve as an executor, trustee or other fiduciary without being 
properly trained and equipped to perform all of the associated tasks in a competent and 
efficient manner." I d. 
96. Id. 
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the discretion to decide if there is such a conflict sufficient to trigger the 
mandatory disclosure requirement.97 Providing a clear ethical rule that is aimed 
directly at drafting lawyer/fiduciaries is consistent with a profession that cares 
about the inherent ethical problems replete in such appointments-solicitation, 
conflicts of interest, overreaching, and undue influence--all of which are 
implicated by the financial benefit to the fiduciary in the first place.98 
Lawyers are often the best choice as personal representative or trustee. 
Elderly clients often have a long relationship with and great confidence in their 
lawyer. Given the mobility of families in twenty-first century America, those 
clients may have tenuous connections at best to their children or siblings in other 
parts of the country. Certainly lawyers who are well versed in fiduciary 
responsibilities and who are constrained by ethical rules and malpractice 
concerns are prime candidates for the job of fiduciary. 
The problem is that lawyers work for money-making it hard to separate 
money as motivation for taking on the mantle of fiduciary from the genuine 
concern that family or friends might have in taking on the same role. As long 
97. The ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility (the 
ABA Committee that issues opinions on ethical issues) is in the process of drafting such 
an opinion on the topic of"The Lawyer Acting as Fiduciary for the Trust or Estate." 
Hopefully, this opinion will make it clear that naming oneself as a fiduciary is a per se 
conflict that requires disclosure and waiver of the conflict by informed consent of the 
client. 
98. Historically, fiduciaries were not entitled compensation for their services. As 
a comparative law matter, in England, the common law concept of a fiduciary as a person 
in whom a testator could "impose a purely conscientious obligation, a precatory, moral 
duty, to confer a benefit upon a third party" still exists. See de Furia, Jr., supra note 21, 
at 305. Professor deFuria stated: 
Under normal circumstances, a testamentary fiduciary [in England] is not 
entitled to remuneration for his services . . ., and this rule extends to 
"solicitors acting as estate fiduciaries, who are only entitled to out-of-pocket 
expenses. . . . The reason for the rule is to prevent the inherent conflict of 
interest and self-dealing that inevitably results whenever a fiduciary profits 
from his trust. . . . Because of this, the English cases reason that a fiduciary 
may not be compensated for his time and trouble. However, if the testator 
specifically directs in his will that the fiduciary is to receive compensation, 
payment will be permitted. . . . Since it would be improper for an attorney to 
s~ggest that his client include a fee payment clause in the will, and since it 
takes an affirmative act on the part of the client to authorize a fiduciary's fee, 
the English rule would appear to reduce somewhat the potential for 
impropriety whenever an attorney drafts a will that names himself as a 
testamentary fiduciary. 
de Furia, Jr., supra note 21, at 305 n.159; see also In re Duke of Norfolk Settlement 
Trust Perth (Earl) v. Fitzalan-Howard, 3 W.L.R. 455 (Eng. C.A. 1981). 
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as the client understands this, there should be no problem. But, with elderly and 
infirm clients, there is always an issue of understanding and volitional action. 
Clients also should be aware that, in addition to a personal representative, 
their estate will require an attorney. Counsel for the estate, in fact, requires 
special legal expertise. When a lawyer is named as the personal representative, 
he or she is faced with the odd prospect of hiring a lawyer for the estate, and 
herein lies one of the ethical pitfalls. Cap a lawyer/personal representative 
really make a detached judgment about who is the best lawyer for the job? Is 
the lawyer really going to hire someone else, or is the lawyer simply going to 
hire himself or herself to do the second job as counsel for the estate? 
Clients should be made aware of this duality of roles and the inherent 
potential conflicts. They are often under the misimpression that the executor has 
to perform the legal tasks necessary to probate the estate or manage the trust and 
do not realize that a sophisticated layperson can hire a lawyer to perform these 
tasks. However, there is no bright line between an informed client who initiates 
a discussion about his lawyer becoming his fiduciary and an uninformed client 
whose lawyer solicits the job. Probing into the murky, gray waters of the 
decision-making process post-facto is difficult at best. Thus, in conjunction with 
the overarching ethical model proposed above, this Article submits that 
concomitant procedural reforms must occur that address the issues of whether 
disclosure has been properly made and whether the client is actually informed. 
Given the increasing graying of the American population, its mobility, and 
a trend toward bank trust services being consolidated or eliminated altogether, 
there is a legitimate need for some clients to choose their lawyer as their 
fiduciary. Thus, the Author would not embrace the absolute prohibition model, 
which would prevent such cases of conflict of interest but which would be 
overbroad in terms of preventing appropriate appointments of drafting lawyer/ 
fiduciaries. From a cost/benefit perspective, the benefits of the absolute 
prohibition model are outweighed by the costs to the public of not having 
enough well-trained fiduciaries to assist them.99 However, the Author 
acknowledges that the drafting attorney conflict is pervasive and the risk of 
breach of the duty of loyalty and impaired judgment as to economic benefit to 
the attorney so likely that those scholars who would embrace such a model are 
not clearly wrong. It is a close call, and there are strong arguments in favor of 
adopting that model as the default rule. 
Given the "consensus" nature of the Ethics 2000 Commission's activity and 
the practical obstacles to having states change their procedural rules in the 
99. See Spurgeon & Ciccarello, The Lawyer in Other Fiduciary Roles, supra note 
9, at 1383 (citing Levin, supra note 21, at 50, for the proposition that an absolute 
prohibition would also cause "serious disruption to the legitimate expectations of the 
client"). 
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probate and trust areas-especially states with large cities where lawyers 
routinely act as trustees for long-standing clients100-the Author believes that a 
"disclosure" model, rather than an absolute prohibition, is the more politically-
saleable model and will meet with more success in implementation-thus 
engendering more likely reform. The next Part of this Article sketches the 
parameters of procedural reforms, in the context of the UPC and the UTC, that 
would provide a mechanism to actually implement and to enforce the ethical 
reforms discussed in the prior Part. 
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE PROCEDURAL MODEL FOR 
DRAFTING ATIORNEYIFIDUCIARIES: 
THE UPC AND UTC101 
When the American public thinks of probate, it assumes a system that 
involves the courts and a personal representative of some sort-a personal 
representative or administrator. This is the only model that most Americans 
have ever known. The English system of court-supervised administration of 
estates, inherited by American law, was designed to protect creditors and 
100. For example, cities like Boston and Philadelphia, where the ''practice of 
lawyers serving as trustees ... is common ... several law firms have sizeable in-house 
trust departments and individual lawyers have served families as trustees for 
generations." Spurgeon & Ciccarello, The Lawyer in Other Fiduciary Roles, supra note 
9, at 1373 ("One estimate is that Boston law firms, in the aggregate, have assets under 
fiduciary management in the range of $3 to $4 billion." (citing Haught, supra note 21, 
at 1 0)). Spurgeon and Ciccarello note that ''virtually the same ethical considerations 
apply either when a lawyer who has drafted a will is designated as the will's executor or 
when a lawyer who prepares an inter vivos or testamentary trust is named to serve as 
trustee." Spurgeon & Ciccarello, The Lawyer in Other Fiduciary Roles, supra note 9, 
at 1373 n.64 (citing Johnston, supra note 21, at 88). The Author also should note that 
the risk ofloss to clients of these larger firms arising from their drafting the instruments 
in which they are named as fiduciaries is practically less because larger firms tend to 
have malpractice and/or fiduciary insurance in place and assets that a beneficiary can 
reach if a victim of malfeasance. 
101. Some of the participants in the UTC Symposium would embrace the ethical 
reforms noted above. They are reluctant to add concomitant procedural changes to the 
UPC and UTC, seeing these as contrary to the non-interventionist philosophy underlying 
both Codes. While the Author believes such procedural changes are necessary to give 
teeth to the ethical rules, and can be done at marginal cost to the overall non-
interventionist model, she would suggest that the proposed changes to the statutory 
section also could be implemented in the Comments. That may allay the concern of 
some Joint Editorial Board members about putting these procedural changes into the 
statutes, while still providing a framework for states to adopt in enforcing disclosure 
requirements. 
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beneficiaries from untrustworthy executors or heirs. But other models of 
reallocating wealth at death exist, including the universal succession model 
extant in the civil law countries of Europe.102 Under this system, the heirs or 
beneficiaries take title to the decedent's property automatically, and there is no 
personal representative to act as an intermediary.103 
In the 1960s, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws launched a project to create a streamlined, uniform set of probate statutes 
that states could adopt to modernize and improve their probate procedures. In 
1969, this effort resulted in the UPC.104 That set of laws has been adopted in 
whole by more than fifteen states, and parts of the UPC have been incorporated 
by virtually every other state.105 The promulgation of the 1969 UPC signaled the 
willingness of some segment of the profession to push for improved procedures 
in probate and to help the public get through this important process with less 
pain and expense. 
Somewhere between supervised probate administration and universal 
succession lies unsupervised probate-the modem trend embraced by many 
American legal scholars and adopted by the drafters of the UPC as its preferred 
mode of probate administration.106 The theory underlying unsupervised probate 
is that, "unless there is a compelling reason, once an executor or trustee is 
appointed, the court should step back and let the fiduciary administer the estate 
102. For a succinct description of the system of universal succession "on the 
continent ofEurope, in Louisiana and in Quebec," see JESSEDUKEMINIER&STANLEYM. 
JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND EsTATES 50 (5th ed. 1995). 
103. SeeUNIF.PROBATECODE §§ 3-312 to3-322, 8 U.L.A. pt. II, at66-75 (1998). 
But, note that "[n]o state has yet adopted these provisions of the [Unifonn Probate 
Code]." DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 102, at 51 (citing Eugene F. Scoles, 
Succession Without Administration: Past and Future, 48 Mo. L. REv. 371 (1983)). 
104. See Lawrence H. Averill, Jr., An Eclectic History and Analysis of the 1990 
Uniform Probate Code, 55 ALB. L. REv. 891, 896 (1992). 
105. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE tbl. of jurisdictions, 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 1 (1998 & 
Supp. 2001). 
106. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE art. III general cmt., 8 U.L.A. pt. II, at 26, 28 
(1998). This general comment states that: 
Overall, the system accepts the premise that the Court's role in regard to 
probate and administration, and its relationship to personal representatives 
who derive their power from public appointment, is wholly passive until some 
interested person invokes its power to secure resolution of a matter. The state, 
through the Court, should provide remedies which are suitable and efficient 
to protect any and all rights regarding succession, but should refrain from 
intruding into family affairs unless relief is requested, and limit its relief to 
that sought. 
UNIF. PROBATE CODE art. III general cmt., 8 U.L.A. pt. II, at 26, 28 (1998). 
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and close it without court intervention. " 107 Academics, some judges, and many 
members of the profession have moved toward this position in large part as a 
response to the public's feeling that probate equals delay and, thus, cost.108 The 
movement also reflects the growing importance of nonprobate assets in the lives 
of many Americans, and it attempts to pull the probate process into closer 
conformity with the transfer of nonprobate assets like joint property, living 
trusts, and life insurance. 
This academic and legislative response to the real and perceived problems 
in American probate is laudable as it actually attempts to bring real-world 
solutions to real people. The problem is that-as always-there is more than 
one public interest at stake in the probate process. While a minimalist approach 
to judicial intervention in the probate process is responsive to the broad public 
concern about court intervention causing expense and delay, there is a competing 
concern illustrated by the discussion above when a drafting attorney names 
himself or herself as the fiduciary. For those clients, there well may be a need 
for more intervention rather than less. 
How can the two policy concerns be reconciled? The answer may lie in an 
alternative model of probate for some cases that involve drafting 
attorney/fiduciaries-carving out a dual track that allows the court to require 
continuing supervision when such a drafting lawyer is acting as a personal 
representative and cannot meet the burden of proving disclosure and informed 
consent. This heightened level of intervention and scrutiny is not completely 
without support in the literature. Louis Laurino has written a powerful brief for 
justifying a higher level of scrutiny for lawyers when they petition for probate 
and appointment. Judge Laurino was a Surrogate of Queens County, New York, 
for a number of years when he wrote: 
In my opinion an attorney because ofhis professional responsibility is 
under a higher duty of care and his performance is subject to closer 
scrutiny by the court than the ordinary layman. Therefore, the 
compulsory ac~ounting which I insist on is well within the 
discretionary power of the court to regulate the performance of its 
officers, the attorney/fiduciary. It is my way of insuring that those 
attorneys who insist on acting as fiduciary will do so properly and 
expeditiously. 109 
107. UNIF. PROBATE CODE art. III general cmt., 8 U.L.A. pt. II, at 26, 28 (1998). 
108. Richard V. WeHman, Georgia Lawyers Revise Their Probate Code, 13 GA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 783, 783-84 (1997). 
109. Laurino, supra note 21, 'jJ1601.2. 
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Judge Laurino also required that the decree appointing such an 
attorney/fiduciary include a requirement that the attorney account to the court 
within one year if the estate is below the federal exemption equivalent and 
within two if it is above. He acknowledged that he made no similar requirement 
of non-lawyer fiduciaries but makes the "officer of the court" argument in favor 
of this treatment, which might be perceived as "discriminatory." 
The UPC's overall ethos is that the state only should act in probate matters 
when called upon by the interested parties.110 It does provide for a supervised 
administration option when a single proceeding, with official court adjudication 
of all important administrative decisions, is the desired forum. 111 Nevertheless, 
the thrust of probate reform under the Code is that most estates will not require 
this supervised process. Nonetheless, there is an argument that more 
intervention-not less-is the better approach in the case of drafting 
lawyer/fiduciaries. The UPC should take a page from existing New York rules 
in this area and build in a judicial inquiry at the time of appointment if the 
petitioner for appointment as personal representative is the drafting attorney. 
The drafters should place the burden of proving disclosure and informed consent 
on the drafting attorney when petitioning for appointment as personal 
representative. If the drafting attorney fails to meet this burden, the judge would 
have the discretion either to refuse appointment or to invoke supervised 
administration. The number of such cases is small and the period of probate 
fairly short; thus, the increased systemic economic and efficiency costs of 
supervised administration are worth the benefits to the beneficiaries of such 
added supervision. 
The Uniform Surrogate's Rules in New York and the local rules in Suffolk 
and Queens Counties provide a model for the UPC in this regard.112 The 
Uniform Surrogate's Rules in New York "[r]equires [the] filing of a statement 
at the time of probate disclosing whether ... [the] named fiduciary is an 
attorney, whether [the] attorney will be estate counsel, and whether [the] 
attorney was the [ drafter]."113 The Rules also address the concern about fees that 
such an appointment raises, mandating that sole lawyer/fiduciaries who are also 
counsel to the estate file an affidavit regarding their fees and commissions \vi thin 
twelve months of their appointment.114 
In Suffolk County, New York, there is a local rule, which provides that: 
110. UNIF. PROBATE CODE art. ill general cmt., 8 U.L.A. pt. II, at 26, 28 (1998). 
111. UNIF. PROBATE CODE§ 3-501, 8 U.L.A. pt. II, at 105 (1998). 
112. Wood, supra note 21, at 206-07. 
113. Wood, supra note 21, at206 (citing N.Y. UNIFORMRULESFORSURR. Cr.§ 
207.19(g) (McKinney 2002)). 
114. Wood, supra note 21, at206 {citing N.Y. UNIFORMRULESFORSURR. Cr.§ 
207.19(g) (McKinney 2002)). 
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in all probate proceedings where the purported will and/or codicil of 
the deceased nominates an attorney as a fiduciary or co-fiduciary, 
there shall be annexed to the probate petition an affidavit of the 
testator setting forth the following: 
1. That the testator was advised that the nominated attorney 
may be entitled to a legal fee, as well as to the fiduciary 
commissions authorized by statute; 
2. Where the attorney is nominated to serve as a co-fiduciary, 
that the testator was apprised of the fact that multiple 
commissions may be due and payable out of the funds of the 
estate; and 
3. The testator's reason for nominating the attorney to serve as 
fiduciary. 
Failure to submit an affidavit of this nature may warrant the 
scheduling of a hearing in order to determine whether the appointment 
of the attorney as fiduciary was procured by the exercise of fraud 
and/or undue influence upon the decedent.115 
Queens County is similar and requires an account from a lawyer/fiduciary 
within twelve months of appointment (or twenty-four months if a federal estate 
tax return is required) regardless of whether there is another lawyer serving as 
counsel to the estate. Unlike most cases where beneficiaries are allowed to 
waive the account if they are comfortable, when the lawyer is also the fiduciary, 
no waiver is allowed. The Queens County Court is even more specific than the 
Suffolk County Court in its rule about affidavits, requiring the affidavit to 
contain: 
[(1)] the length and nature of the attorney's association with [the] 
testator prior to [the date of the] will[; (2) the] reasons the decedent 
gave for selecting the attorney as fiduciary[; (3)] conversations 
between the testator and the attorney-draft[ er] re[garding] fees and 
commissions[; ( 4)] whether [the] attorney-fiduciary or h[ er] finn [will] 
also [serve as the] estate attorney, and if not, why not ... [; and(S) the] 
attorney must attach h[ er] drafting notes, including next-of-kin data. 116 
These New York probate rules provide a useful prototype for developing 
a model that builds in a more proactive judicial inquiry at the time of 
115. Wood, supra note 21, at 207-08 (citing N.Y. SUFFOLK COUNTY SURR. cr. 
RULES§§ 1850.6(b), 1850.10 (McKinney 2002)). 
116. Wood, supra note 21, at 207 (citing N.Y. QUEENS COUNTY SURR. cr. RULES 
§ 1858.1 (McKinney 2002)). 
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appointment and the possibility of supervised administration when attorneys fail 
to meet that burden.117 The UPC is the effective vehicle for implementing such 
a model and the one best positioned to have a national impact. 
c A. Drafting Attorneys as Personal Representatives118 
Sections 3-301119 and 3-402120 of the UPC provide for the contents of the 
application for informal and formal probate, as well as the request for 
appointment of the personal representative. 121 These Sections essentially require 
certain statements be contained in the petition. The drafters of the Code might 
consider inserting an additional requirement that the petitioner must disclose in 
the application if he or she was also the attorney who drafted the will. 
The inclusion of this information would trigger an inquiry by the court at 
the hearing provided for in Section 3-403122 as to whether the drafting attorney 
in fact made full disclosure to the client and whether the client gave informed 
117. The Author thinks it is important to give judges the discretion to trigger 
supervised administration because, for many years after such reforms would be 
implemented, there would be cases of drafting attorney/fiduciaries who would not be able 
to meet the burden simply because the will was drafted prior to disclosure becoming 
mandatory. In such cases, the judge could review the affidavit and decide for herself 
whether there was the "scent" of undue influence or overreaching. If not, giving the 
judge the discretion to order supervised probate would not defeat the intent of the testator 
but, rather, would serve to solve some of the monitoring problems inherent in such 
appointments. It also raises the cost of naming the lawyer as fiduciary and might act as 
a disincentive for such appointments in the future in inappropriate cases-cases that lack 
adequate disclosure and informed consent-as information trickles down to attorneys and 
testators. 
118. When a court appoints a lawyer as a personal representative in an intestacy 
situation, there is a strong argument that supervised administration should be mandatory. 
This is particularly true in a case where the court appoints an administrator for an 
intestate decedent's estate because there are no close relatives and the only takers are 
more distant kin out of state. The lawyer in the case has had no dealings with the 
decedent, and the decedent has shown no preference for the lawyer. However, the 
Author leaves this issue for another article. Note, however, that there is deep concern 
among some in the legal community about how such appointments are made. See 
Special Committee on Fiduciary Appointments Created, 43 N.Y. STATEBARNEWS, Jan.-
Feb. 2002, at 1. "In early 2000, the chief judge [ofNew York State] appointed both a 
commission and a special inspector general to examine the system of fiduciary 
appointments, which critics call rife with cronyism." !d. 
119. UNIF. PROBATE CODE§ 3-301, 8 U.L.A. pt. II, at 55-56 (1998). 
120. UNIF. PROBATE CODE§ 3-402, 8 U.L.A. pt. II, at 79 (1998). 
121. UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 3-301, 3-402, 8 U.L.A. pt. II, at 55-56, 79 (1998). 
122. UNIF. PROBATE CODE§ 3-403, 8 U.L.A. pt. II, at 80-81 (1998). 
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consent to the nomination of the drafting attorney as the personal representative. 
The standard for full disclosure and informed consent could be the ACTEC 
standard articulated in its Commentaries or that contained in the new Comment 
8 of the Ethics 2000 revisions to Model Rule 1.8. The proof might include a 
form of written disclosure similar to that provided by the Georgia Supreme Court 
in their Formal Advisory Opinion No. 91-R1, which states:123 
A testator's or settlor's freedom to select an executor or trustee is 
an important freedom, and it should not be restricted absent strong 
justification. For a variety of reasons, the attorney may be the most 
appropriate choice of fiduciary for the client. The risk that some 
lawyers may take advantage of a lawyer-client relationship to benefit 
themselves in a manner not in the cl~ent's best interest should not 
outweigh that freedom. 
The risk of self-dealing instead creates the need for restrictions that 
offer assurance that the naming of the lawyer as executor or trustee is 
the informed decision of the testator or settlor. An attorney's full 
disclosure is essential to the client's informed decision and consent. 
Disclosure requires notification of the attorney's potential interest in 
the arrangement; i.e., the ability to collect an executor's or trustee's 
fee and possibly attorneys fees. Unlike a real estate transaction where 
an attorney has a personal interest in the property, being named as 
executor or trustee does not give the attorney any personal interest in 
the estate or trust assets other than the fee charged. Waiver of State 
law fiduciary requirements in the document is permissible as long as 
waiver is ordinary and customary in similar documents for similar 
clients that do not name the attorney as fiduciary. 
In the light of the above, full disclosure in this context should 
include an explanation of the following: 
1. All potential choices of executor or trustee, their relative 
abilities, competence, safety and integrity, and their fee structure; 
2. The nature of the representation and service that will result if 
the client wishes to name the attorney as executor or trustee (i.e., 
what the exact role of the lawyer as fiduciary will be, what the 
lawyer's fee structure will be as a lawyer/fiduciary, etc.); 
3. The potential for the attorney executor or trustee hiring him or 
herself or his or her firm to represent the estate or trust, and the fee 
arrangement anticipated; and 
123. Supreme Court of Georgia, Formal Advisory Op. 91-1 (1991) (on file with the 
Missouri Law Review). The Author would like to thank Professor Anne Emmanuel for 
bringing the Georgia Advisory Opinion to her attention. 
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4. An explanation of the potential advantages to the client of 
seeking independent legal advice. 
These disclosures may be made orally or in writing, but the client's 
consent or the attorney's notice to the client should be in writing. 
The client's consent could be obtained by having the client sign a 
consent form that outlines the information described above.124 
343 
That form and notification and consent letter covers the issues of other 
candidates for the position and double-compensation as well as a statement of 
the client that the choice is voluntary, that the conflicts were disclosed, and that 
the opportunity for independent legal advice was provided. The drafters should' 
make clear that the burden is on the attorney to prove disclosure and informed 
consent. 
At the hearing, the court would have to decide whether the attorney met the 
burden, in which case the appointment could proceed without further court 
intervention. If the attorney failed to meet the burden, the court could choose to 
refuse appointment or order supervised administration under Section 3-501. The 
rationale for giving the court discretion at this juncture is to confer on the court 
some deference in decidingwhetherthisparticularcase involves undue influence 
or overreaching (in which case a refusal to appoint would be appropriate), or 
whether the attorney knew the client for a long time, there is little risk of undue 
influence, and the attorney simply drafted the will prior to mandatory disclosure 
rules being enacted or was sloppy in documenting the decision-making process. 
Obviously, as the years proceed after enactment of the disclosure model, judges 
124. The Form of Consent Offered in the Georgia Advisory Opinion reads: 
I, (Client) havevoluntarilynamedasexecutor 
and trustee in my will and trust, (Attorney) ____ __, 
who prepared the in.strument in his/her capacity as my attorney. Mr./Ms. 
_____ (Attorney) did not promote himself/herself or 
consciously influence me in the decision to name him/her as executor and 
trustee. In addition, Mr./Ms. (Attorney) has 
disclosed the potential conflicts which he/she thinks might arise as a result of 
his/her serving as both executor and trustee and as attorney for the estate and 
trust. An explanation of the different roles as fiduciary and attorney, an 
explanation of the risks and disadvantages of this dual representation, an 
explanation of the manner in which his/her compensation will be determined, 
and an opportunity to seek independent legal advice were provided to me 
prior to my signing this consent. 
Date ______ _ 
(Signature) 
Supreme Court of Georgia, Formal Advisory Op. 91-1 (1991) (on file with the Missouri 
Law Review). 
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should be more and more reluctant to forgive a lack of documented disclosure 
and informed consent. 
Section 3-501 of the Code and the Sections that follow allow the court to 
impose supervised administration on a particular estate. Section 3-501 defines 
supervised administration as: 
a single in rem proceeding to secure complete administration and 
settlement of a decedent's estate under the continuing authority of the 
Court which extends until entry of an order approving distribution of 
the estate and discharging the personal representative or other order 
terminating the proceeding. 125 
Section 3-502 allows the court to approve a petition for supervised 
administration if: (1) the will directs it, unless circumstances have changed and 
it is no longer necessary; (2) the will directs unsupervised administration but the 
court feels that there is a real need to protect the beneficiaries; or (3) the will is 
silent and "the Court fmds that supervised administration is necessary under the 
circumstances. "126 
Shifting some drafting attorney cases to the supervised track is appropriate 
in that most lawyer/fiduciaries take on the mantle of fiduciary as a business 
matter. They also may be doing it to accommodate the client or the court. This, 
however, does not diminish the fact that they are essentially professional 
fiduciaries. While supervised administration may cost the decedent's estate 
more, perhaps this added cost is a small price to pay to prevent abuse of the 
fiduciary role. The profession may have to choose between being more 
interventionist and minimizing cases of lawyer/fiduciary ethical and financial 
abuse, and being more laissez-faire but living with the costs of more of these 
cases. The inherent risks ofbreach of traditional trust and agency rules in terms 
of the duty of loyalty and conflicts of interest are so great as to warrant the 
economic and efficiency costs in terms of a few estates being put on a supervised 
track. Such a rule indeed would shift those additional costs to clients who might 
well have a firm desire for their lawyer to act as fiduciary. But this particular 
allocation of costs seems appropriate in light of the increased protection for all 
vulnerable clients that such a model would yield. Adopting this model would go 
a long way toward assuring the public that the profession is actively 
discouraging attorneys from taking advantage of their elderly clients. 
Supervised administration under Section 3-502 does not bring with it a 
requirement that the personal representative check in with the court prior to 
every action. To accomplish this, the personal representative's letters of 
125. UNIF. PROBATE CODE§ 3-501, 8 U.L.A. pt. II, at 105 (1998). 
126. UNIF. PROBATE CODE§ 3-501, 8 U.L.A. pt. II, at 105 (1998). 
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appointment must be marked or"endorsed" to indicate to third parties, like banks 
or brokerage houses, that he or she needs permission from the court to take 
action, like buying or selling securities. 127 The drafters of the UPC should 
consider amending Section 3-504 to require such restrictions on the power of a 
drafting lawyer who has not met the burden of disclosure and informed consent 
but who has been allowed to proceed under supervised administration. This 
would help prevent the misuse of liquid assets in bank accounts or brokerage 
accounts by drafting lawyer/fiduciaries that often occurs in cases of 
lawyer/fiduciary abuse. Other restrictions may be appropriate, as well. 
In addition to the revisions outlined above, the drafters might well consider 
making the drafting attorney's posting bond and filing accounts mandatory acts 
not subject to waiver by the testator or the beneficiaries. Section 3-603 provides 
that the court may require bond unless the will waives the requirement.128 Such 
a waiver should be disallowed in the case of drafting attorneys. This would add 
a layer of protection for the beneficiaries. Informed consent or not, the practice 
is so replete with conflicts and lack of oversight that bond should be made 
mandatory in such cases. 
Waiver of accounts by naive beneficiaries is another problem in many cases 
oflawyer/fiduciary abuse. In Section 3-1001, the drafters could add a proviso 
that a drafting attorney closing an estate must file an accounting, thus preventing 
waiver of such by consent of the beneficiaries.129 While making accountings 
mandatory deprives the beneficiaries of the choice to make the administration 
less costly, that restriction must be weighed against the benefit of preventing 
future cases of drafting attorney abuse. 
The costs to the overall probate system of such revisions to the Code are 
minimal. They will not affect estates that do not have drafting lawyers 
petitioning to be personal representatives-which are the vast majority. 
Admittedly, these changes will impose a marginally greater cost on that small 
percentage of cases that involve drafting lawyer/fiduciaries, but those costs will 
be well worth the benefits of increased court oversight of lawyers who have 
enormous power over the assets of decedents. This proposal thus minimizes the 
costs to the overall system as much as possible by targeting a narrow group of 
cases that the legal profession can regulate and has an interest in overseeing-
probate matters in which lawyers are accepting appointments as fiduciaries in 
their professional capacities. The bench and the bar have a significant self-
interest in making sure that such fiduciaries a~t in the most ethical manner 
possible. 
127. UNIF. PROBATE CODE§ 3-504, 8 U.L.A. pt. II, at 108 (1998). 
128. UNIF. PROBATE CODE§ 3-603, 8 U.L.A. pt. II, at 115 {1998). 
129. UNIF. PROBATE CODE§ 3-1001, 8 U.L.A. pt. II, at 288 (1998). 
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B. Drafting Attorneys as Trustees130 
Part IV, A, above, endorsed a model for the appointment of drafting 
attorneys as personal representatives that would give the court the authority 
either to refuse to appoint the petitioner or to put him or her on a supervised 
track. As personal representatives serve for a relatively short period and their 
duties are fairly discrete, this seems an appropriate response to the ethical 
problems of drafting attorney/fiduciaries in the probate context. When it comes 
to trusts, however, the duties of trustee generally last much longer. Supervised 
administration seems too burdensome to impose on the system in this context 
because the supervision would have to go on for a very long time.131 
130. Article VII of the Uniform Probate Code ("UPC") attempts to harmonize the 
treatment of such trusts within the system of wealth transfer and to streamline the 
procedures for administering them and providing a forum for disputes. See UNIF. 
PROBATE CODE art. VII general cmt., 8 U.L.A. pt. II, at483 (1998). The Uniform Trust 
Code ("UTC") essentially replaces Article VII. For a discussion of the UTC's 
provisions, see David M. English, Is There a Unifonn Trust Act in Your Future?, 14 
PROB. &PROP. 25 (Jan./Feb. 2000). 
131. Note that the Section of the UTC that governs judicial proceedings makes 
clear the preference for a minimalist approach to judicial intervention or continuing 
supervision of trusts. See UNIF. TRUST CODE§ 201 (2000) [hereinafter UTC], which 
provides as follows: 
(a) The court may intervene in the administration of a trust to the extent its 
jurisdiction is invoked by an interested person or as provided by law. (b) A 
trust is not subject to continuing judicial supervision unless ordered by the 
court. (c) A judicial proceeding involving a trust may relate to any matter 
involving the trust's administration, including a request for instructions and 
an action to declare rights. 
The Comment to Section 201 provides: 
While the Uniform Trust Code encourages the resolution of disputes without 
resort to the courts by providing such options as the nonjudicial settlement 
authorized by [§] 111, the court is always available to the extent its 
jurisdiction is invoked by interested persons. The jurisdiction of the court 
with respect to trust matters is inherent and historical and also includes the 
ability to act on its own initiative, to appoint a special master to investigate 
the facts of a case, and to provide a trustee with instructions even in the 
absence of an actual dispute. Contrary to the trust statutes in some States, the 
Uniform Trust Code does not create a system of routine or mandatory court 
supervision. While subsection (b) authorizes a court to directthat a particular 
trust be subject to continuing court supervision, the court's intervention will 
normally be confined to the particular matter brought before it. 
UTC § 201 cmt. 
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In Section 201 of the UTC,132 the court is given the unilateral authority to 
intervene when its jurisdiction is invoked by persons interested in the trust under 
Section 201 or as provided by law. The Author proposes making a drafting 
attorney who is a sole trustee of a trust grounds for removal under Section 706.133 
132. UTC § 201. 
133. Note the fairly recent California statute that allows the court to scrutinize 
drafting attorney/sole trustee cases and give its approval-at least providing for those 
cases where the lawyer may be the only appropriate trustee-but discouraging the 
practice. See CAL. PROB. CODE§ 15642 (West 2000) (providing for the removal by the 
court of a sole trustee who also drafted the instrument unless the court finds no undue 
influence). This Section reads: 
(a) A trustee may be removed in accordance with the trust instrument, by the 
court on its own motion, or on petition of a settlor, cotrustee, or beneficiary 
under Section 17200. 
(b) The grounds for removal of a trustee by the court include the following: 
(6) Where the sole trustee is a person described in subdivision (a) of 
Section 21350, whether or not the person is the transferee of a donative 
transfer by the transferor, unless, based upon any evidence of the intent 
of the settlor and all other facts and circumstances, which shall be made 
known to the court, the court finds that it is consistent with the settlor's 
intent that the trustee continue to serve and that this intent was not the 
product of :fraud, menace, duress, or undue influence. Any waiver by the 
settlor of this provision is against public policy and shall be void. This 
paragraph shall not apply to instruments that became irrevocable on or 
before January 1, 1994. This paragraph shall not apply if any of the 
following conditions are met: 
(A) The settlor is related by blood or marriage to, or is a 
cohabitant with, any one or more of the trustees, the person who 
drafted or transcribed the instrument, or the person who caused the 
instrument to be transcribed. 
(B) The instrument is reviewed by an independent attorney who 
(1) counsels the settlor about the nature of his or her intended 
trustee designation and (2) signs and delivers to the settlor and the 
designated trustee a certificate in substantially the following form: 
CERTIFICATE OF INDEPENDENT REVIEW 
I,--------------------" have reviewed 
(attorney's name) 
______________ and have counseled my client, 
(name of instrument) 
-----------:----'fully and privately on the nature and 
(name of client) 
legal effect of the designation as trustee of __________ _ 
(name of trustee) 
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The court should be required to make the same sort of inquiry as to whether an 
contained in such instrument. I am so disassociated from the interest of the 
person named as trustee as to be in a position to advise my client impartially 
and confidentially as to the consequences of the designation. On the basis of 
this counsel, I conclude that the designation of a person who would otherwise 
be subjectto removal under paragraph ( 6) of subdivision (b) ofSection 15642 
of the Probate Code is clearly the settlor's intent and such intent is not the 
product of fraud, menace, duress, or undue influence. 
(Name ofattomey) (Date) 
This independent review and certification may occur either before or after the 
instrument has been executed, and if it occurs after the date of execution, the 
named trustee shall not be subject to removal under this paragraph. Any 
attorney whose written engagement signed by the client is expressly limited 
to the preparation of a certificate under this subdivision, including the prior 
counseling, shall not be considered to oth.erwise represent the client. 
(C) After full disclosure of the relationships of the persons 
involved, the instrument is approved pursuant to an order under 
Article 10 (commencing with Section 2580) of Chapter 6 ofPart 
4 of Division 4. 
(7) For other good cause. 
(c) If, pursuant to paragraph (6) of subdivision (b), the court finds that the 
designation of the trustee was not consistent with the intent of the settlor or 
was the product of fraud, menace, duress, or undue influence, the person 
being removed as trustee shall bear all cost:; of the proceeding, including 
reasonable attorney's fees. 
(d) If the court finds that the petition for removal of the trustee was filed in 
bad faith and that removal would be contrary to the settlor's intent, the court 
may order that the person or persons seeking the removal of the trustee bear 
all or any part of the costs of the proceeding, including reasonable attorney's 
fees. 
(e) If it appears to the court that trust property or the interests of a beneficiary 
may suffer loss or injury pending a decision on a petition for removal of a 
trustee and any appellate review, the court may, on its own motion or on 
petition of a cotrustee or beneficiary, compel the trustee whose removal is 
sought to surrender trust property to a cotrustee or to a receiver or temporary 
trustee. The court may also suspend the powers of the trustee to the extent the 
court deems necessary. 
(f) For purposes of this section, the term "related by blood or marriage" shall 
include persons within the seventh degree. 
CAL. PROB. CODE § 15642 {West 2000); see also CAL. PROB. CODE§§ 21351 {a), 21355 
(West 2000) (providing that a gift to a drafting attorney is invalid if the drafting attorney 
is not a relative of or cohabitant with the testator, or if another independent attorney has 
not executed a certificate of independent review or a court does not determine there was 
no undue influence). 
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attorney who is the sole trustee of the trust drafted the instrument in question. 
If he or she did, the court would have the power to inquire as to whether there 
was appropriate disclosure and informed consent. If the drafting attorney/trustee 
meets his or her burden of proving such disclosure and informed consent, the 
attorney would continue on as trustee. If the attorney fails to meet that burden, 
however, the court would have to remove the attorney from his or her role, thus 
making such lack of disclosure a grounds for removal under Section 706. The 
court would not have the discretion, in this case, to supervise the administration 
of the trust as such supervision might go on for a long time, thus shifting the 
balance in terms of the cost/benefit to the overall wealth transfer system. A new 
trustee would have to be found-admittedly thwarting the intent of some settlors 
but, on balance, ensuring the integrity of the overall systems of trust 
administration and attorney ethics. One might argue that a lack of disclosure and 
informed consent in this context essentially renders the settlor's intent to choose 
that particular trustee defective. It was not an intent formed with the full 
information and, thus, given American courts' historical focus on the settlor's 
intent in trust law, should be viewed as a failure to form proper intent. This may 
be a removal rationale that is conceptually consistent with the jurisprudential 
tradition in the trust law area. 
Even if the drafting attorney meets his or her burden of proving disclosure 
and informed consent, the drafters might consider building in an added layer of 
beneficiary protection by making the obligation to post bond under Section 702 
mandatory and the duty to inform and report under Section 813 mandatory.134 
This would protect unknowing settlors and beneficiaries from waiving important 
protections. 135 
All of the changes proposed are based on the premise that it is the unusual 
case where a testator or settlor would use a lawyer as the fiduciary. Thus, the 
increased costs of judicial intervention and mandatory bond and accountings 
affect only a small number of cases in which there is a significant underlying risk 
of unethical behavior. 136 The specific changes are certainly open to debate 
among those in the profession, but there is no doubt that a failure to shine a 
134. Note that the drafters of the UTC stated that the provisions in Article 8 are 
default rules, most of which may be superseded by the trustee-except the duty to notify 
beneficiaries and to respond to their requests in certain circumstances. See UTC § 
I 05(8)-(9). To add teeth to the mandatory bond requirements, the drafters might consider 
making this provision a "non-default rule" in Section 1 05(b) not subject to waiver in the 
trust when the drafting attorney is the sole trustee. 
135. See CAL. PROB. CODE§ 16062(e) (West 2000) (stating "any limitation or 
waiverin a trust instrument ofthe obligation to account is against public policy and shaii 
be void as to any sole trustee who is a disqualified person as defined in Section 
21350.5"). 
136. For a similar argument, see deFuria, Jr., supra note 21, at 275. 
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brighter light on drafting attorney/fiduciary cases will result in additional 
headlines about "bad" lawyers who have abused their clients' trust. That cost to 
the profession and the victims of these lawyers is incalculable. 
V. ADDITIONAL STRUCTURAL REFORMS 
There are additional mechanisms that would minimize the risk of 
inappropriate use of drafting attorney/fiduciaries. In states that allow "double-
dipping," i.e., payment to a lawyer for his or her work as executor plus payment 
for his or her work as lawyer for the estate, lawyers act as executors in about ten 
percent of the cases probated.137 In states that frown on such "double-dipping," 
only one percent or two percent of the estates have attorney/executors.138 Given 
these statistics, it is pretty clear that money is a primary motivation for taking on 
the duties and liabilities posed by acting as the fiduciary rather than just as the 
fiduciary's lawyer. 
This monetary incentive and the close relationship between elderly client 
and savvy lawyer is ripe for potential abuse. Removing the incentive to do both 
jobs should reduce the temptation to solicit the nomination as executor, and the 
statistics indicate that it does. The profession has taken some steps to remove the 
financial incentive for attorneys to act as fiduciaries as well as taking on the role 
of attorney for the estate or trust. In some states, attorneys have been allowed 
to "double dip"-or to be paid for their work in both capacities. The more recent 
trend has been away from "double dipping," in large part as a response to the 
public's perception that it again takes advantage of the client for the lawyer's 
benefit. Two of the largest and most legally influential states have been the 
battlegrounds where this issue has been fought out during the past decade. 
California and New York have hosted legislative battles over the issue of 
"double dipping" with very different results. 
California is a "statutory fee schedule" state in which both the executor and 
the basic attorney's fee are not based on the actual amount of work done for the 
estate. Rather, they are a percentage of the probate estate itself, and the same 
percentage is given to both the executor and the attorney. New York is a 
"statutory fee schedule" state with regard to executor's fees, and lawyers may 
also collect fees for their legal services in addition to their executor's fees, when 
acting in both capacities. 139 
137. Laurino, supra note 21, 'II 1601.2 (describing a 1975 American Bar 
Foundation comparative study of estate administration in the United States). 
138. Laurino, supra note 21, 'II 1601.2 (describing a 1975 American Bar 
Foundation comparative study of estate administration in the United States). 
139. CAL. PROB. CODE§ 10800 (West 2000); N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. Acr LAW§ 
2307 (McKinney 1997). A majority of states allow double-dipping according to Laurino, 
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The legislative push to address executor compensation in California was a 
direct result of the fallout from the Gunderson case in Orange County.140 Prior 
to the changes in the California law, case law alone indicated that an attorney 
who acted as both an attorney and an executor should not be allowed to take the 
full amount ofboth fees. 141 However, in the wake of Gunderson (in addition to 
several other important legislative changes), the California Assembly responded 
to the public outcry by codifying the prohibition on "double dipping," creating 
a clear statutory bar against the practice. 142 
While the California Assembly grappled with the issue, a New York 
Advisory Panel chaired by two judges proposed legislation to address the 
problem. During the debate on the proposed bill dealing with "double-dipping" 
in New York, lawyers and bar associations fell on both sides of the issue. One 
of the chairs of the Advisory Committee on the proposed legislation said that 
concernaboutlawyer/executors appeared to be "verywidespread,"143particularly 
in New York City where as many as twenty-five percent of estates had executors 
who also served as the attorney for the estate.144 The Advisory Committee 
proposed a bill that it said would '"reduce the potential for abuse' and 
'overreaching by lawyers' .»~45 The Advisory Committee bill would have cut the 
executor commission in half unless an attorney disclosed the dual compensation 
and obtained a written waiver from the client. Facing vigorous opposition, the 
sponsors of the package dropped this piece in July 1993.146 
While the New York State Bar's Trusts and Estates Law Section endorsed 
the bill, the powerful Association of the Bar of the City of New York and the 
New York County Lawyer's Association spoke adamantly against the limit on 
executors' commissions. Their position was that lawyers should be entitled to 
supra note 21, ~ .1600. 
140. For a description of the high-profile Gunderson case, see Davan Maharaj, 
Leisure World Lawyer Heir to Clients' Millions; Estates: James D. Gunderson, Who 
Prepared Wills for Thousands of Retirees, Vigorously Denies Wrongdoing, L.A. TIMES, 
Nov. 22, 1992, at AI. See also Estate of Merrill A. Miller v. James D. Gunderson, No. 
A-166214 (Orange County Super. Ct. Apr. 22, 1998) (No. G016789 consolidated with 
No. G017879) (on file with Author). 
141. Similarly, case law discouraged gifts to drafting attorneys prior to the 
California Assembly's enactment of a specific probate code section on the matter. See 
Magee v. State Bar of Cal., 374 P.2d 807, 810-13 (Cal. 1962). 
142. CAL.PROB. CODE§ 10804 (West2000). 
143. Gary Spencer, Opinion Divided on Changes to Surrogate's Act, N.Y. L.J., 
May 26, 1993, at 1. 
144. Id. 
145. Id. 
146. Gary Spencer, County Lawyers Suggest Measure on Executor Fees, N.Y. L.J., 
Aug. 6, 1993, at 1. 
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full executors' commissions and should be given "reasonable compensation" for 
attorney services based on the work done.147 Jerome Solomon, on behalf of the 
New York County Lawyers, took the position that the bill was "'an unwarranted 
attack upon the integrity of the bar as a whole'" and that "'[t]here [was] no 
empirical evidence of widespread abuses and, to the extent that there are abuses, 
there are adequate policing measures in place. "'148 Even before the bill was 
passed, a practice had developed among New York's surrogate judges to reduce 
the legal fees of attorney/executors to half the amount of the executor's 
commission. 149 
After two years of debate, a much-watered-down version that "inverts the 
presumption"150 in the Committee's bill was passed. It provided that a full 
commission would be paid unless the disclosure requirement was violated 
"rather than limiting payment to half the statutory rate unless the client consents 
to more."151 The Advisory Committee, while defeated in its efforts for stricter 
legislation, announced the fmal bill would increase disclosure and enhance client 
understanding of the dual compensation issue-one of the Advisory 
Committee's main concerns.152 
The EPTL Advisory Committee drafted its reduced commission 
proposal in 1993, responding in part to public complaints about the 
growing cost of administering estates and the duplication of costs 
when attorney-executors are paid full commissions and legal fees for 
duties that sometimes overlap. Since many clients could be expected 
to balk at authorizing a full commission if a half-commission was the 
statutory standard, its bill sought to discourage attorneys from taking 
dual roles by reducing the financial incentive.153 
The New York proposal: 
took a middle course between recent statutes enacted in other states. 
California was more stringent on attorney-executors, allowing them a 
full commission but no legal fees without prior court approval. At the 
other extreme, Florida allows them full commissions and attorney's 
147. Spencer, supra note 143. 
148. Spencer, supra note 143. 
149. Spencer, supra note 143. 
150. Gary Spencer, Bill Seeks Limit on Lawyer Fees on Estate Work, N.Y. L.J., 




HeinOnline -- 67 Mo. L. Rev. 353 2002
2002] FIDUCIARY DUTY 
fees, which consist of regular hourly rates plus 1 to 2 percent of estate 
assets. 1s4 
353 
The New York law applied to wills executed after January 1, 1996, and 
decedents dying after December 31, 1996, regardless of when their will was 
executed. Iss 
The opponents of completely eliminating any chance of"double dipping" 
without court approval prevailed in New York, unlike in California. The recent 
New York law was designed to address situations: 
where the client may think or presume that naming his or her attorney 
as executor will reduce the commissions and/or legal fees charged to 
the estate. In the past, lawyers who failed to address this issue in the 
will drafting process were open to criticism by disgruntled heirs or the 
courts.Is6 
The statute only applies to lawyers who actually draft the will in which they are 
named executor and does not apply to the trustees of inter vivos (revocable or 
irrevocable) or testamentary trusts-thus, perhaps, "serv[ing] to encourage [the] 
increased use of revocable inter-vivos trusts." 157 The New York legislation that 
finally passed was, in essence, a disclosure statute-it did not prohibit "double-
dipping," it merely required that the lawyer disclose this possibility and the right 
of the client to negotiate a fee prior to death. It keeps with the spirit of the Ethics 
2000 proposal regarding the lawyer "advising the client concerning the nature 
and extent of the lawyer's financial interest in the appointment."1s8 
Presumably, each of these new statutory schemes will discourage lawyers 
from taking on the role of fiduciary simply for monetary gain. The California 
approach will do much more in this regard, but both are useful efforts at limiting 
the number of lawyer/fiduciaries to those cases in which the client needs the 
lawyer's particular expertise. 1s9 
154. ld. 
155. ld. The bill, N.Y. Senate No. 3195-A, became N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. Acr 
LAW§ 2307-a (McKinney 1997). Spencer, supra note 150. 
156. Gerald I. Carp & Sanford J. Schlesinger, Disclosure Requirements for 
Attorney Serving as Executor, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 14, 1995, at 1. 
157. ld. 
158. ABA Report, supra note 5. 
159. For a review ofhow courts have implemented Section 2307-a in New York, 
see Ilene Sherwyn Cooper, Rehashing Disclosure Requirements of Attorney Fiduciaries, 
N.Y. L.J., June 15, 2001, at 3. Note also that the California legislation also invalidated 
gifts to drafting attorneys and facilitated the removal of drafting attorneys who named 
themselves as the sole trustee of a trust. CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 15642, 21355 (West 2000). 
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A. Deterrence, Detection, and Compensation 
In addition to the ethical reforms suggested in the last Part and the 
procedural reforms outlined in this one, the legal profession can do much more 
to prevent the cases of lawyer/fiduciary misconduct that may result from a 
drafting attorney naming himself or herself as a sole, unsupervised fiduciary. 
The inherent conflicts may make such eventual misconduct more likely.160 These 
first group of reforms: (1) deter lawyers from abusing their fiduciary duty; (2) 
detect lawyers who are doing so earlier; and (3) increase the amount of 
compensation available to victims of these lawyers. The second group of 
suggested reforms aims to improve the quality of the actors and the institutions 
in the system through better training oflawyers and judges and by increasing the 
resources available to probate courts. 
The first group of reforms is directed at increasing 
deterrence-discouraging lawyer/fiduciaries from engaging in misconduct in the 
first place. The ethical and procedural reforms discussed previously should go 
a long way toward deterrence; if the lawyer has a clear ethical guideline and 
knows that there may be mandatory supervision of his or her actions, lawyers 
bent on misconduct may avoid the role of fiduciary. In addition, increasing the 
frequency of bar disciplinary proceedings and criminal prosecutions will have 
a deterrent effect on such lawyers. This may be more effective than increasing 
the severity of the punishment in the cases in which lawyers are caught. Harsher 
penalties may be disregarded by lawyers inclined to misconduct because such 
lawyers seem to gauge the risk ofbeing caught as low. Increasing the chances 
of being punished may do far more to deter them from such behavior than 
strengthening the penalties received by the few lawyers who are disciplined or 
prosecuted. 
In addition to punishing lawyers, more pervasive efforts to intervene in 
cases in which lawyers are substance abusers or demonstrate addictive behavior 
will have a deterrent effect on lawyers. Increasing the funding for effective 
lawyer assistance programs will help identify problem lawyers early, and 
encouraging other lawyers to suggest that their colleagues in need seek help to 
These changes were aimed at preventing another "Gunderson" scenario from happening 
in the future. See Conservatorship of Bryant v. Brown, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 755,762 (Ct. 
App. 1996) (''The report of [James] Gunderson's self-dealing and extensive fraud was 
the catalyst for Assemblyman Umberg to introduce Assembly Bill No. 21, December 7, 
1992.... Assemblyman Umberg's office stated 'the primary purpose of A.B. 21 is to 
strictly forbid attorneys from drafting (or causing to be drafted) wills that leave 
themselves, or relatives or business partners, any gifts."'). 
160. The Author admittedly does not have empirical evidence of this proposition 
but anecdotal evidence suggests embezzlement and similar behavior is certainly 
facilitated if the drafting attorney i~ also the sole fiduciary. 
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get the problem under control would all go a long way toward preventing cases 
of lawyer/fiduciary misconduct. 161 
Getting lawyers to report misconduct by other lawyers will increase 
deterrence, as well as detection.162 In many cases of lawyer/fiduciary 
misconduct, there are other lawyers who suspected or outright knew that the 
lawyer/fiduciary was engaging in misconduct but did not comply with their 
ethical obligations to report that behavior to the bench or bar. Improving 
enforcement of the whistle blower rules under the Model Rules will help courts 
identify these cases earlier. If such lawyers know their colleagues are likely to 
blow the whistle, it will deter at least some of them from engaging in the conduct 
in the first place. 
Random audits by the bench and bar are another mechanism for improving 
the detection of misconduct by lawyer/fiduciaries.163 The Virginia Bar 
Commission recommended random audits after one high-profile case in the 
state.164 Random audits have proven effective in ferreting out misconduct not 
only in probate matters but also in lawyer thefts from client security funds. New 
York has had some luck with its "bounced check" rule that flags lawyers who 
write bad checks from client trust accounts.165 
161. See generally Rick B. Allan, Alcoholism, Drug Abuse and Lawyers: Are We 
Ready to Address the Denial?, 31 CREIGHTON L. REv. 265 {1997). 
162. See In re Himmel, 533 N.E.2d 790 (Ill. 1988) (an attorney was disciplined for 
failing to report the unethical behavior of another attorney). But see In re Ethics 
Advisory Panel Opinion No. 92-1, 627 A.2d 317,318-19 (R.I. 1993), cited in ACTEC 
COMMENTARIES, supra note 91, at 147-48, which stated: 
A lawyer to whom former lawyer for client confessed embezzlement from 
client may not report misconduct by former lawyer without client's consent. 
The information was learned during the course of representing the client, 
which is within the scope of Rhode Island version of [Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct] Rule 1.6 .... The Advisory Panel asks the Supreme 
Court Committee to study the rules ... and to consider amending Rhode 
Island's version ofRule 1.6 to deal with this type of anomalous situation. 
163. Some participants in the UTC Symposium would embrace the ethical reforms 
purported above combined with random audits and improvements in the post-facto 
remedies, like client protection funds, as sufficient measures to address the problem of 
drafting attorneys. They would not endorse the procedural changes to the UPC and UTC 
suggested above because they move in a more interventionist direction-contrary to the 
underlying philosophy ofthe Model Codes. The Author feels that the procedural reforms 
are also necessary to give teeth to the ethical rules and can be made with little cost to the 
overall non-interventionist principle of the UPC and UTC. 
164. Special Committee on Lawyers Serving as Fiduciaries, Report to the Council 
of the Virginia State Bar, Recommendations in Favor of a Program of Random Reviews 
(June 1, 1993) (available from the Virginia State Bar). 
165. Jill Schachner Chanen, Keeping a Lid on lllegal Takings: Commonsense 
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In addition to random audits, making accounts mandatory will help increase 
detection of lawyer malfeasance. More importantly, improving the courts' and 
beneficiaries' ability to review these accounts, as well as quick penalties for 
failure to file them on time, are essential to improving the chances ofidentifying 
and stopping lawyer/fiduciary misconduct in its tracks. The rise of the Internet 
offers the resources needed to facilitate these kinds of reforms. Probate records 
and accounts now can be made available on-line, with less expense, and 
computerization of records, in general, will make it easier for both court 
personnel and beneficiaries to monitor fiduciary behavior as it occurs. 
No system is perfect, and, even if all of these reforms were implemented, 
there would be cases that slip through the cracks. Thus, there is a crying need 
for a better safety net or system of compensation for the victims of 
lawyer/fiduciaries whose behavior causes damage to their clients or their heirs 
and beneficiaries. There are three areas that can be strengthened to accomplish 
this result. The first of these is ensuring that lawyer/fiduciaries post bond. The 
second is adequate funding of state client protection funds. 166 These are sorely 
in need of more funding if they are to be serious mechanisms for compensating 
the victims of intentional misconduct on the part oflawyer/fiduciaries. In many 
cases of lawyer/fiduciary misconduct, the state client protection fund has fallen 
far short of fully compensating the needy victims of lawyer malfeasance. 
The third and final element of a viable safety net for the victims of 
lawyer/fiduciary misconduct is to considerimplementingmandatorymalpractice 
or fiduciary insurance as a condition of being a licensed attorney or 
attorney/fiduciary. While intentional misconduct is often excluded from such 
policies, other misconduct of a lawyer/fiduciary is often covered. The legal 
profession, as a whole, would do well to consider following the example of 
Oregon and of foreign countries that require lawyers to have some coverage in 
the event of malpractice.167 The American public-if it fully understood the 
Procedures Can Keep Employees' Hands out of the Cookie Jar, 85 A.B.A. J. 74, 75 
(June 1999) (''Twenty-six states now have mandatory overdraft protection for client trust 
accounts. Banks are required to notify the state lawyer disciplinary agency when those 
accounts are overdrawn."). 
166. See generally Harriet L. Tumey & John A. Holtaway, Client Protection Funds 
-Lawyers Put Their Money Where Their Mouths Are, 9 PROF. LAW. 18 (Feb. 1998). 
167. Manuel R. Ramos, Legal Malpractice: The Profession's Dirty Little Secret, 
4 7 V AND. L. REv. 1657, 1726 ( 1994). The 111inois State Bar Association is also planning 
to send a recommendation to the Illinois Supreme Court to ask that the court implement 
a mandatory malpractice insurance rule like Oregon has. Molly McDonough, Push for 
Mandatory Coverage: Illinois Bar Wants to Make Malpractice Insurance the Law, ABA 
J. EREPORT, Jan. 11,2002. Note that many other countries mandate minimum limits for 
professional liability insurance as a condition of practicing law. According to studies 
conducted in 1995, England, France, Germany, Australia, Belgium, the Netherlands, 
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Sweden, British Columbia, Ontario, and Quebec were among the countries, along with 
Canadian provinces, that required some form of malpractice insurance. LIABILITY OF 
LA WYERS AND INDEMNITY INSURANCE 7 5 (Albert Rogers et al. eds., 1995) [hereinafter 
LIABILITY OF LAWYERS]. Solicitors in England were required to carry at least the 
equivalent of$1.5 million in insurance. Id. at 118. This coverage derives from solicitor 
taxes that are paid into the Solicitors' Compensation Fund maintained by the Law 
Society. Id. at 114. 
In France, attomeyswererequiredby law (Law no. 71-1130)to carry the equivalent 
of at least $400,000 in insurance. !d. at 127. Certain bars, such as the Paris Bar, have 
insurance policies that their members must purchase; other bars allow attorneys to select 
their own policies. Id. In 1995, when malpractice claims against attorneys were on the 
rise, the bar councils were considering a country-wide system with uniform insurance 
requirements depending on firm size. !d. 
German attorneys were required by the BRAO (Bundesrechtsanwaltsordnung) to 
carry at least the equivalent of$375,000 in insurance with an aggregate no lower than 
$1,428,000. Id. at 131. Attorneys are also "obliged to render proofto the local bar that 
[they are] properly insured." Id. 
For most states in Australia, the amount of malpractice insurance required was the 
equivalent of $820,600 per claim, which can be purchased using the Australian legal 
profession's malpractice insurance plans. Jd. at 77-78. 
''The Belgian Bars take out collective insurance policies for their members" and pay 
the insurance premiums with part of the attorneys' annual bar dues. !d. at 84. The bar 
policies provide coverage up to the equivalent of$500,000 for contractual claims, up to 
the equivalent of$8 million for ''bodily damage," and up to the equivalent of$800,000 
for "other damage." Jd. 
In the Netherlands, the Dutch Bar Association "is charged with ensuring a 
guarantee to the public that each lawyer has made adequate provision to meet claims 
arising from his professional liability." LAW WITHOUT FRONTIERS: A COMPARATIVE 
SURVEY OF THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS APPLICABLE TO THE CROSS-BORDER 
PRACTICE OF LAW 116 (Edwin Godfrey ed., 1995) [hereinafter LAW WITHOUT 
FRONTIERS]. Though the Bar does not offer an insurance plan, attorneys must obtain 
malpractice policies providing coverage for at least the equivalent of$570,000 per claim 
with an aggregate of the equivalent of $1.1 million. LIABILITY OF LA WYERS, supra, at 
171-72. 
Attorneys in Sweden were required to carry insurance in an amount equivalent to 
$415,000 per claim. LIABILITY OF LAWYERS, supra, at 226. Bar dues are used for the 
Swedish Bar Association's insurance plan for its members. LIABILITY OF LAWYERS, 
supra, at 226. 
In British Columbia, Canada, both a statute and the Law Society require that 
attorneys carry malpractice insurance in an amount equivalent to $1 million per claim. 
LAW WITHOUT FRONTIERS, supra, at 189. Attorneys pay an annual fee to the Law 
Society's insurance plan. If an attorney does not pay the fee and is uninsured, the 
attorney "is prohibited from practicing law until the fee is paid." LAW WITHOUT 
FRONTIERS, supra, at 189. 
The Law Society in Ontario, Canada, has a malpractice insurance plan that provides 
coverage up to the required amount for attorneys, which is the equivalent of$736,700. 
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situation-would be justifiably angry that lawyers who must obtain a license 
from the state to practice law, and, thus, have a monopoly on providing those 
services, do not have a concomitant obligation to ensure there is insurance 
available to compensate the victims of their negligence. Short of mandatory 
malpractice for all attorneys, or mandatory disclosure that an attorney does not 
carry malpractice insurance, 168 lawyer/fiduciaries should be required to carry 
"liability insurance in an appropriate amount for the purposes of protecting the 
estate, trust or other account and its beneficiaries from any misappropriation or 
misapplication of fiduciary funds or other insurable loss."169 
B. Improving the Actors and the Institutions 
The central actors in the probate process-lawyers-are run through a 
rigorous, three-year post-graduate education. This education suffers from a 
number of systemic flaws that should be addressed in order to produce lawyers 
better suited to taking on the mantle of fiduciary. More specific curricular focus 
on those skills needed to be an effective and honest fiduciary, as well as more 
attention to the alternative kind of judgment that fiduciaries must exercise, as 
opposed to that used by lawyer/advocates, would go a long way toward 
improving service to the those clients who choose to name lawyers as their 
fiduciaries. 170 
LIABILITY OF LAWYERS, supra, at 93. Attorneys pay an annual fee that is used for 
insurance purposes. LAw WITHOUT FRONTIERS, supra, at 172. 
Attorneys in Quebec, Canada, are required by statute to carry malpractice insurance 
with the Quebec Bar Insurance Fund, unless their practice "does not represent a risk to 
the public." LIABILITY OF LAWYERS, supra, at 95. The plan's coverage totals about the 
equivalent of $720,000 per claim. LIABILITY OF LA WYERS, supra, at 95. 
168. "The ABA' s Standing Committee on Client Protection, which once promoted 
making malpractice insurance mandatory, is now proposing a new Model Rule based on 
the South Dakota Model." Mark Hansen, Under Covered: Proponents Say Fewer 
Lawyers Will Go Bare If Forced to Disclose Their Insurance Status, 87 A.B.A. J. 46,47 
(Nov. 2001). South Dakota (as well as Ohio and Alaska) mandates that lawyers must 
disclose to their clients the fact that they do not carry malpractice insurance. See 
McDonough, supra note 167. 
169. See Cook, supra note 95. 
170. The Fordham Conference Working Group concluded its recommendations 
with the following final component: "Lawyers should be trained in the social sciences 
relative to older persons. Thus, programs that will educate lawyers representing older 
persons in the range of social sciences as they affect older persons should be developed 
with a focus on the decision-making capacity of older persons." Recommendations of 
the Conference, supra note 10, at 1001; see also Monopoli, supra note 15 (laying out 
new curricular paradigm for training law students to be more conscious of and skilled in 
the lawyer's role as fiduciary in addition to that of zealous litigator). 
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hnprovements in the training of probate judges and the development of their 
professional and managerial skills would help minimize the chances for 
cronyism and mismanagement of cases that result in lawyer/fiduciary 
misconduct going undetected or unaddressed by the courts for months and 
years. 171 State budgets should include increased funding to improve judicial 
education, as well as to enhance the courts themselves through the addition of 
probate staff, the implementation of computerized records, and the more rapid 
movement of cases through the system. 
Finally, butnotunimportantly, is the education of consumers of probate and 
trust services. The bar should resist efforts to minimize the amount of 
information on the wealth transfer system that is available to consumers.172 The 
Internet and related technological advances will help develop more sophisticated 
clients and beneficiaries. In the end, that is the most effective defense against 
a lawyer/fiduciary who is engaged in misconduct. It is also a critical element in 
improving the overall reputation of the bench and bar in this country-a goal all 
members of the profession should share. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
There is little question that lawyers will continue to be appointed as 
fiduciaries given the graying of the American population, the mobility of 
American families, and the transfer of trillions of dollars in wealth from the 
World War II generation to their Baby Boom offspring. There always will be 
clients without family or friends to take on the role of administering and 
distributing their estates or managing their assets. Given the transformation of 
the banking industry and the reduction in the number of tnist departments that 
offer personal service, lawyers are well-positioned to fill this gap. They should 
be encouraged and trained to become competent, ethical fiduciaries. 173 As 
United States Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter said: 
[Lawyers act] in defense of right and to ward off wrong. From a 
profession charged with such responsibilities there must be exacted 
those qualities of truth speaking, of a high sense of honor, of granite 
discretion, of the strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility, that 
171. The National College of Probate Judges is an organization dedicated to 
improving the training and professionalism of probate judges and probate courts. The 
organization's home page is http://www.ncpj.dni.us/NCPJ/. 
172. See, e.g., Unauthorized Practice ofLaw Comm'n v. Parsons Tech., Inc., 179 
F.3d 956, 956 (5th Cir. 1999) (per curiam). 
173. The Author thanks Professor John Langbein for his insights on this issue 
during the UTC Symposium on February 15, 2002. 
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have, throughout the centuries, been compendiously described as 
moral character. 174 
With a clear ethical framework and substantive procedural reform, 
lawyer/fiduciaries will be able to serve the American public well, while adhering 
to the high standards articulated by Justice Frankfurter. 
174. Schware v. Bd. ofBar Exam'rs of the State ofN.M., 353 U.S. 232, 247 (1957) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
